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I. INTRODUCTION
Among the core doctrines of U.S. contract law is that there are no puni-
tive damages for a mere breach of contract.1 In fact, in many jurisdictions, a
party can lie about or cover up a breach without risking punitive damages in
fraud, under the rule that a breach cannot support an action for fraud.2 But
government contracts are different. The False Claims Act (FCA)3 expressly
prohibits government contractors from submitting “a false record or state-
Michael Holt is an associate at Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton LLP. Gregory Klass is
the John Carroll Research Professor of Law at Georgetown University Law Center. The
authors are grateful for comments on earlier versions of this work from Emma Coleman Jor-
dan, Heidi Feldman, Colette Matzzie, Alegra McLeod, David Super, and Carl Vacketta, as
well as participants in the Georgetown Faculty Workshop. Erin Morgan provided excellent
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1. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 355 (1981).
2. Florida, for example, permits liability for fraud in the performance only for “acts … inde-
pendent from acts that breached the contract.” HTP, Ltd. v. Lineas Aereas Costarricenses, S.A.,
685 So. 2d 1238, 1239 (Fla. 1996); see also Gregory Klass, Contracting for Cooperation in Recovery,
117 YALE L.J. 2, 45–49 (2007) [hereinafter Klass, Contracting for Cooperation].
3. 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729–3733 (2006 & Supp. III 2009).
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ment” material to a claim for payment.4 And under the judicially created
doctrine of implied certification, a mere request for payment implicitly re-
presents material compliance with the contract, as well as relevant statutes
and regulations. As a result, a government contractor who requests payment
without disclosing a known material breach can violate the FCA, triggering
treble damages and fines of between $5,000 and $10,000 for each payment
request.5 Whereas between private parties even an express lie about perfor-
mance will often go unpunished, the mere request for payment by a non-
compliant government contractor can result in significant legal liability.
Although the implied certification doctrine is radical from the perspective
of “normal” contract law, contract scholars have to date paid scant attention
to it.6 The neglect is all the more remarkable given the dollar amounts at
stake. The Department of Justice reports that qui tam plaintiffs alone filed
over 300 False Claims Act actions per year in each of the past fifteen years.7
In all but one of the last ten years, settlements and judgments under the
FCA have totaled over $1 billion.8 In 2010, the Government initiated 138
cases and recovered over $620 million, while qui tam plaintiffs filed 574 suits
and recovered nearly $2.5 billion in settlements and judgments.9 While the
Department of Justice does not disaggregate claims of implied certification,
individual implied-certification cases have resulted in awards upwards of $99
million.10 Twenty-seven states, the District of Columbia, and many cities
have analogous statutes.11 And the Securities and Exchange Commission, in
response to high-profile frauds by members of the securities industry, has re-
cently implemented enhanced whistleblower provisions modeled after the
FCA.12 The scholarly inattention to the implied certification doctrine is also
4. Id. § 3729(a)(1)(B) (Supp. III 2009).
5. Id. § 3729(a)(1) (Supp. III 2009).
6. The only sustained discussion of the doctrine is Susan C. Levy et al., The Implied Certifica-
tion Theory: When Should the False Claims Act Reach Statements Never Spoken or Communicated, but
Only Implied?, 38 PUB. CONT. L.J. 131 (2008). The circuit split on implied certification is also
discussed in Michael Murray, Note, Seeking More Scienter: The Effect of False Claims Act Interpre-
tations, 117 YALE L.J. 981, 982–84 (2008).
7. CIVIL DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FRAUD STATISTICS OVERVIEW: OCTOBER 1, 1987–
SEPTEMBER 30, 2010, at 1–2, available at http://www.justice.gov/civil/docs_forms/C-FRAUDS_
FCA_Statistics.pdf.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 2.
10. United States ex rel. Tyson v. Amerigroup Ill., Inc., 488 F. Supp. 2d 719, 742 (N.D. Ill.
2007).
11. See State False Claims Acts, TAXPAYERS AGAINST FRAUD EDUC. FUND, http://www.taf.org/
statefca.htm (last visited July 30, 2011).
12. See Press Release, SEC, SEC Adopts Rules to Establish Whistleblower Program (May 25,
2011), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2011/2011-116.htm; Proposed Rules for Imple-
menting the Whistleblower Provisions of Section 21F of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
75 Fed. Reg. 70488, 70491 n.14 (Nov. 17, 2010) (“Because the qui tam provisions of the False
Claims Act have played a significant role in the development of whistleblower law generally, and
because some of the terminology used by Congress in Section 21F has antecedents in the False
Claims Act, precedent under the False Claims Act can provide helpful guidance in the interpreta-
tion of Section 21F of the Exchange Act.”).
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remarkable given the confusion in the case law. Circuits are today split on
implied certification.13 Several have expressly declined to recognize the doc-
trine.14 Those that have allowed claims of implied certification differ on the
scope of the rule.15
This Article aims to develop a theory of implied certification under the
False Claims Act and to recommend a way forward for both courts and con-
tracting agencies. Our theory has two parts. First, we argue that the FCA as
a whole is designed to enable the Government to contract for information
about performance—information for which the Government has a special
need.16 This locates the FCA within the broader theory of contractual duties
to cooperate in recovery for breach.17 Second, we argue that the implied cer-
tification rule is best understood as a dual interpretive default.18 Most ob-
viously, the rule establishes a default interpretation of government contrac-
tors’ claims for payment: absent a statement to the contrary, the request
represents material compliance with the contract and with relevant statutes
and regulations. Because parties could contract around that claim default,
the implied certification rule is also a contractual default: claims for payment
are interpreted in accordance with the first default only if the parties have
not provided otherwise in their contract.
This theoretical framework allows us to systematically identify and evalu-
ate the costs and benefits of the implied certification rule. Applying Ian
Ayres and Robert Gertner’s theory of interpretive defaults,19 we argue that
the default interpretation of a claim as representing material compliance is
both majoritarian and information forcing. It is majoritarian because, one
hopes, most government contractors who request payment are in material
compliance and so would want to make the representation. It is information
forcing because the rule gives contractors in breach a new reason to share
that fact. We also argue that the certification default is separately justified by
the special ethical obligations of government contractors.20 Contractors who
have knowingly and materially breached their contract with the Government
or violated relevant statutes and regulations should disclose that fact before
requesting payment.
But implied certification also has its costs. The certification default lowers
the pleading bar, making it easier for a frivolous qui tam lawsuit to survive a
motion to dismiss.21 And it threatens to extend FCA liability to contractor
13. See infra Part III.A.
14. See infra note 147.
15. See infra Part III.A.
16. See infra Part II.B.
17. Klass, Contracting for Cooperation, supra note 2, at 44.
18. See infra Part IV.B.
19. Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of
Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 97 (1989) [hereinafter Ayers & Gertner, Filling Gaps]; Ian Ayres &
Robert Gertner,Majoritarian vs. Minoritarian Defaults, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1591, 1608 (1999).
20. See infra notes 255–58 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 138–41 and accompanying text.
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duties that are more effectively monitored and enforced in other ways.
These costs suggest some advantage of forcing the Government to expressly
contract for implied certification. Without implied certification as the con-
tractual default, contracting agencies might be more likely to evaluate where
FCA liability is beneficial and to craft express certification requirements
accordingly. The last advantage, however, assumes a certain level of care
and competence in contracting agencies. A more jaundiced view suggests an
institutional-competence argument for the contractual default: the implied
certification rule extends the FCA’s protections to reach transactions in
which the contracting agency has erroneously failed to require express certi-
fications of compliance.
Our dual-default theory of the implied certification rule results in practi-
cal recommendations for both courts and contracting agencies.22 Courts
that have not yet recognized implied certification should do so, and we pro-
pose a new rule for deciding implied certification cases. Under this rule, the
fact that a contract, statute, or regulation conditions either participation in
or payment for a contract on compliance with it creates a prima facie case
that a claim for payment represented such compliance, shifting the burden
to the defendant to show that FCA liability would interfere with other regu-
latory monitoring and enforcement mechanisms. This rule balances the
competing costs and benefits of implied certification and resolves several
open questions in the implied certification jurisprudence. While it has yet to
be articulated by any court, the rule finds support in the FCA case law.
In a first-best world, there would be no need for implied certification.
Agencies at the time of contracting would weigh the costs and benefits of
certification backed by the FCA, and require that contractors expressly cer-
tify compliance with only those duties where FCA certification would be
advantageous. But even with implied certification, contracting agencies can
take steps to approximate first-best results. Herein lies the benefit of identi-
fying the rule as a contractual default. Agencies can and should write their
contracts to require express certification of compliance with those duties for
which FCA liability makes sense. And they should expressly contract out of
implied certification of compliance with duties that are better enforced by
other regulatory mechanisms.
In balancing the theoretical and practical aspects of our discussion, we
have found it necessary to limit our treatment of some topics that a more
one-sided discussion might address. Two bear special mention. First, we
largely take for granted results from the scholarship on government pro-
cesses about the special hurdles that the Government faces in monitoring
and enforcing contractual compliance.23 Although we say a few new things
about how the content of government contracts can exacerbate these prob-
lems, we largely take for granted phenomena like limited monitoring
22. See infra Part IV.C.
23. See infra notes 89–94 and accompanying text.
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resources,24 agency capture,25 and various forms of corruption.26 Second, we
provide only the briefest of discussions of the special ethical duties of those
who contract with the Government. The existing scholarship on this ques-
tion is thin, so our claims here rest on appeals to intuition rather than to
authority. The ethical obligations of government contractors deserve a more
detailed study. We hope that our examination of the implied certification
rule might provide useful materials for such a project.
Part II of this Article describes the False Claims Act as a whole and pro-
vides a theoretical explanation of why the Act’s extracompensatory remedies
make good sense in the context of government contracting. Parts III and IV
are about the judicially created doctrines of implied certification. Because
there has been relatively little scholarship on implied certification under the
FCA, we think it helpful to reconstruct the rule’s history and examine the
current doctrine in some detail. This is the project of Part III, which among
other things distinguishes between implied certification of no pre-formation
fraud in the inducement and implied certification of post-formation perfor-
mance, examines the statutory authority for the implied certification rules,
and diagnoses a judicial confusion about the legal effect of contractually re-
quired certification. Readers who are more interested in our theoretical con-
clusions might want to skim Part III, or can skip it entirely. Part IV develops
our theory of implied certification. A brief discussion of the rule for fraud in
the inducement sets the stage for our central argument, which concerns the
rule for implied certification of post-formation compliance. After providing
a general account of the costs and benefits of implied certification, we apply
these lessons to suggest where courts and contracting agencies should take
the rule.
II. THE FALSE CLAIMS ACT
One cannot explain or evaluate the judicially created rules for implied certi-
fication under the False Claims Act without first understanding the purpose
of the Act as a whole. This Part provides an account of the function of FCA
liability within the broader law of government contracting. The first section
gives an overview of the False Claims Act. The second develops a theoretical
account of the Act’s positive function within government contracting.
A. A False Claims Act Primer
The False Claims Act was first enacted in 1863 in response to reports of
widespread fraud by government contractors during the early years of
the Civil War.27 The original Act contained both civil and criminal penal-
24. See infra note 91.
25. See infra note 90.
26. See infra note 89.
27. False Claims Act, ch. 67, 12 Stat. 696 (1863); CONG. GLOBE, 36TH CONG., 3d SESS. 952
(1863) (“The country, as we know, has been full of complaints respecting the frauds and corrup-
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ties.28 These provisions were separately codified in 1874 and have since
evolved independently.29 This Article examines the Act’s civil provisions.30
The FCA targets false or fraudulent claims against the Federal Govern-
ment.31 While courts divide up the elements in different ways, there is broad
agreement that in order to succeed in an FCA action, a plaintiff must show
by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant “(1) made a claim,
(2) to the United States government, (3) that is false or fraudulent, (4) know-
ing of its falsity, and (5) seeking payment from the federal treasury.”32 There
is no requirement that the Government have suffered damages as a result of
the fraud.33 This Article focuses on the third element, that the claim was
false or fraudulent, which is discussed in greater detail in the next Part. Here
we provide a more general description of the elements as a whole, including
recent changes to the FCA’s materiality requirement, remedies for FCA vio-
lations, and the Act’s qui tam provisions.
A “claim” under the FCA is a request for money or property from the
Government.34 The request might be made directly to the Government, or
it might be made to a third party that is supplying money or property on the
Government’s behalf or to advance a government program or interest,
where those funds or that property has been or will be provided by the Gov-
ernment.35 Claims include not only claims for payments due, but also claims
for favorable actions by the Government, such as in a loan application.36
The Act also prohibits the use of false records, false statements, or acts of
tions practiced in obtaining pay from the Government during the present war; and it is said, and
earnestly urged upon our attention, that further legislation is pressingly necessary to prevent
this great evil; and I suppose there can be no doubt that these complaints are, in the main, well
founded.”); see also James B. Helmer Jr. & Robert Clark Neff Jr., War Stories: A History of the
Qui Tam Provisions of the False Claims Act, the 1986 Amendments to the False Claims Act, and Their
Application in the United States ex rel. Gravitt v. General Electric Co. Litigation, 18 OHIO N.U.
L. REV. 35, 35 (1991).
28. False Claims Act, ch. 67, 12 Stat. at 697–98.
29. U.S. REV. STAT. tit. 36, § 3490; U.S. REV. STAT. tit. 70, § 5438 (1875). The civil version
of the Act is currently codified at 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729–3733 (2006 & Supp. III 2009). The crimi-
nal version of the Act is codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 287 (2006).
30. For a general discussion of the criminal provisions of the FCA, see Brendan Gallagher &
Stacey N. Kime, False Statements and False Claims, 47 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 527, 545–58 (2010).
31. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(A) (Supp. III 2009).
32. Mikes v. Straus, 274 F.3d 687, 696 (2d Cir. 2001) (discussing elements of a claim under
§ 3729(a)(1)(A)). The preponderance-of-the-evidence standard is a result of the 1986 amend-
ments to the Act. See S. REP. NO. 99-345, at 7 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266,
5272 (discussing with concern the clear-and-convincing-evidence standard that had been
adopted by some courts).
33. Harrison v. Westinghouse Savannah River Co., 176 F.3d 776, 785 n.7 (4th Cir. 1999);
United States ex rel. Anti-Discrimination Ctr. of Metro N.Y., Inc. v. Westchester Cnty., 668
F. Supp. 2d 548, 568 (S.D.N.Y. 2009); United States ex rel. Joslin v. Cmty. Home Health of
Md., Inc., 984 F. Supp. 374, 383 (D. Md. 1997); United States ex rel. Pogue v. Am. Healthcorp,
Inc., 914 F. Supp. 1507, 1513 (M.D. Tenn. 1995).
34. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(b)(2)(A) (Supp. III 2009).
35. Id. § 3739(b)(2); United States v. President & Fellows of Harvard Coll., 323 F. Supp. 2d
151, 187 (D. Mass. 2004) (“[A] defendant may be liable if it operates under a policy that causes
others to present false claims to the government.”).
36. United States v. Neifert-White Co., 390 U.S. 228, 230–33 (1968).
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concealment to avoid or decrease an obligation to pay or transmit money or
property to the Government.37 Suits to recover for the avoidance of pay-
ments are termed “reverse” FCA actions.38 Courts are unanimous in holding
that the FCA does not reach all forms of deception, but only that which tar-
gets the government fisc.39 As the First Circuit has explained, the Act “at-
taches liability, not to underlying fraudulent activity or to the government’s
wrongful payment, but to the ‘claim for payment.’ ”40
As we discuss in much greater detail in Part III.A, a claim can be false or
fraudulent for the purposes of FCA liability in three different ways.41 First, a
claim is false or fraudulent if it is for goods or services that have not been
rendered.42 Courts term these “factually false” claims.43 Second, a claim is
false or fraudulent if the contractor expressly certifies compliance with a
contract term, statute, or regulation despite a breach or violation.44 These
are “legally false” claims based on an express certification.45 Third, some
courts have held that a claim for payment itself implicitly represents material
compliance with contract terms, statutes, or regulations.46 Where that im-
plied representation is false, the claim is again termed “legally false,” but
now by virtue of an implied certification.47
The False Claims Act imposes liability only on false claims made know-
ingly.48 “Knowingly” is defined to include actual knowledge of the false-
hood, “deliberate ignorance of the truth or falsity of the information,” or
reckless indifference to it.49 While the plaintiff must show that the defendant
knew in this sense that the information provided was false, the plaintiff is not
required to prove that the defendant specifically intended to defraud the
Government.50
37. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(G) (Supp. III 2009).
38. United States ex rel. Bain v. Ga. Gulf Corp., 386 F.3d 648, 653 (5th Cir. 2004).
39. Neifert-White Co., 390 U.S. at 232; United States v. McNinch, 356 U.S. 595, 599 (1958);
Harrison v. Westinghouse Savannah River Co., 176 F.3d 776, 785 (4th Cir. 1999); United States
v. Rivera, 55 F.3d 703, 709 (1st Cir. 1995).
40. Rivera, 55 F.3d at 709.
41. See Mikes v. Straus, 274 F.3d 687, 696–97, 699–700 (2d Cir. 2001); United States ex rel.
Hockett v. Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp., 498 F. Supp. 2d 25, 64 (D.D.C. 2007). See also
Levy et al., supra note 6, at 134.
42. See, e.g.,Mikes, 274 F.3d at 697.
43. United States ex rel. Conner v. Salina Reg’l Health Ctr., Inc., 543 F.3d 1211, 1217 (10th
Cir. 2008);Mikes, 274 F.3d at 697.
44. See 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(B) (Supp. III 2009).
45. United States ex rel. Hutcheson v. Blackstone Med., Inc., No. 10-1505, 2011 WL
2150191, at *4 (1st Cir. June 1, 2011); Conner, 543 F.3d at 1217;Mikes, 274 F.3d at 696–97.
46. Mikes, 274 F.3d at 700; Ab-Tech Constr., Inc. v. United States, 31 Fed. Cl. 429, 434
(1994).
47. Conner, 543 F.3d at 1218;Mikes, 274 F.3d at 699.
48. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1) (Supp. III 2009).
49. Id. § 3729(b)(1)(A).
50. Congress added the definition of “knowing” and “knowingly” to the FCA in 1986 in
response to judicial constructions of the Act as requiring proof of specific intent to defraud. See
S. REP. NO. 99-345, at 6–7 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 5271–72 (“As a civil
remedy designed to make the Government whole for fraud losses, the civil False Claims Act cur-
rently provides that the Government need only prove that the defendant knowingly submitted
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In 2009, Congress amended the FCA to expressly include a materiality
requirement for allegations of false certification (legal falsehoods).51 Prior to
the amendments, several circuits had declined to read a materiality require-
ment into the statute.52 Others required that plaintiffs show that the false-
hood was material to the Government’s decision to pay,53 though those cir-
cuits disagreed as to the proper test for materiality.54 Resolving a circuit
split, the 2009 amendment added an express materiality requirement and de-
fined the term “material” as “having a natural tendency to influence, or be
capable of influencing, the payment or receipt of money or property.”55
A contractor that violates the False Claims Act is liable for treble dam-
ages, for civil penalties of between $5,000 and $10,000 for each false claim
submitted, and for the plaintiff ’s costs.56 Except where the defendant has co-
operated with the discovery and investigation of the offense,57 courts have
no discretion to award less than treble damages or to reduce the per-claim
a false claim. However, this standard has been construed by some courts to require that the
Government prove the defendant had actual knowledge of fraud, and even to establish that the
defendant had specific intent to submit the false claim.… The Committee believes this standard
is inappropriate in a civil remedy and presently prohibits the filing of many civil actions to
recover taxpayer funds lost to fraud.”).
51. Compare 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(B) (2006) (“knowingly makes, uses, or causes to be made
or used, a false record or statement to get false or fraudulent claim paid or approved by government”)
with id. § 3729(a)(1)(B) (2010) (“knowingly makes, uses, or causes to be made or used, a false rec-
ord or statement material to a false or fraudulent claim”) (emphasis added).
Unlike section 3729(a)(1)(B), section 3729(a)(1)(A), which prohibits factually false claims,
does not mention materiality. One court has explained the difference as follows: “[W]here the
allegation is a factually false claim, any ‘materiality’ requirement would seem to be easily met in
that the government paid a claim in a factually wrong amount, paid for a service that was not
actually provided, or paid an amount greater than it should have based on the service actually
provided.” United States ex rel. Sharp v. E. Okla. Orthopedic Ctr., No. 05-CV-572-TCK-
TLW, 2009 WL 499375, at *6 n.8 (N.D. Okla. Feb. 27, 2009).
52. Mikes, 274 F.3d at 697; United States ex rel. Cantekin v. Univ. of Pittsburgh, 192 F.3d
402, 415 (3d Cir. 1999).
53. United States ex rel. Conner v. Salina Reg’l Health Ctr., Inc., 543 F.3d 1211, 1219 (10th
Cir. 2008); United States v. Bourseau, 531 F.3d 1159, 1170–71 (9th Cir. 2008); United States ex
rel. A+ Homecare, Inc. v. Medshares Mgmt. Grp., Inc., 400 F.3d 428, 443–44 (6th Cir. 2005);
United States v. Southland Mgmt. Corp., 326 F.3d 669, 679 (5th Cir. 2003) (en banc) (Jones, J.,
concurring); United States ex rel. Costner v. URS Consultants, Inc., 317 F.3d 883, 887 (8th Cir.
2003); Luckey v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 183 F.3d 730, 732–33 (7th Cir. 1999); United States
ex rel. Berge v. Bd. of Trs., 104 F.3d 1453, 1459 (4th Cir. 1997); United States v. TDC Mgmt.
Corp., 24 F.3d 292, 298 (D.C. Cir. 1994); United States v. Data Translation, Inc., 984 F.2d
1256, 1267 (1st Cir. 1992); Tyger Constr. Co. v. United States, 28 Fed. Cl. 35, 55 (1993).
54. A+ Homecare, 400 F.3d at 445 (“The circuits which have addressed the issue of materiality
are inconsistent on the standard to be used.”). In the Fourth Circuit, for example, a plaintiff was
required to show that the false claim had a “natural tendency” to cause the Government to pay,
Berge, 104 F.3d at 1460–61, while in the Eighth Circuit, a plaintiff had to demonstrate “outcome
materiality,” or that knowledge of the false claim would have caused the Government to act dif-
ferently, Rabushka ex rel. United States v. Crane Co., 122 F.3d 559, 563 (8th Cir. 1997). See also
A+ Homecare, 400 F.3d at 445–46 (discussing different standards and adopting the “natural ten-
dency” test).
55. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(b)(4) (Supp. III 2009).
56. Id. § 3729(a)(1)–(3).
57. Id. § 3729(a)(2).
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penalty below the $5,000 minimum.58 The impact of the per-claim penalties
cannot be overstated. Depending on a contractor’s billing practices, they can
total tens of millions of dollars.59 Nor are the per-claim penalties condi-
tioned on a showing of actual harm to the Government.60 The Supreme
Court has characterized the FCA’s imposition of treble damages and civil
penalties as “essentially punitive in nature,”61 but has also stressed that the
high measures assure that “the Government is fully compensated for the
costs of corruption,” which often goes undetected.62
Since its inception, the False Claims Act has provided for enforcement
through qui tam actions, in which a private party, or “relator,” brings suit on
behalf of the Government.63 The Act establishes as a jurisdictional require-
ment that a qui tam plaintiff be the original source of information about the
fraud: she must have “direct and independent knowledge of the information
on which the allegations are based, and [have] voluntarily provided such
information to the Government before filing an action.”64 Thus, a private
party cannot sue under the FCA based only on information that is already
publicly known.65 After a qui tam suit is filed, the Government can choose
whether or not to intervene.66 If the Government decides not to intervene,
the successful relator receives between twenty-five and thirty percent of the
proceeds of the action, unless she was involved in the planning and execution
of the fraud, in which case the court may reduce the award.67 If the Govern-
ment intervenes, the relator receives between fifteen and twenty-five percent
58. See United States ex rel. Tyson v. Amerigroup Ill. Inc., 488 F. Supp. 2d 719, 741–42
(N.D. Ill. 2007); United States v. Lorenzo, 768 F. Supp. 1127, 1133 (E.D. Pa. 1991).
59. See, e.g., Tyson, 488 F. Supp. 2d at 741–42 (upholding a jury’s finding of 18,130 false
claims and imposing the minimum $5,000 penalty per claim).
60. See, e.g., Ab-Tech Constr., Inc. v. United States, 31 Fed. Cl. 429, 434 (Fed. Cl. 1994)
(awarding statutory per-claim penalties despite the fact that “no proof has been offered to show
that the Government suffered any detriment to its contract interest because of Ab-Tech’s
falsehoods”).
61. Vt. Agency of Natural Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 784 (2000).
62. United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 450 (1989).
63. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(1) (2006) (“A person may bring a civil action for a violation of [the
FCA] for the person and for the United States Government.”); False Claims Act, ch. 67, 12 Stat.
696, 698 (1863) (“Such suit may be brought and carried on by any person, as well for himself as
for the United States.”); see also CONG. GLOBE, 37TH CONG., 3D SESS. 955–56 (1863) (statement
by Sen. Howard) (“The effect of [the qui tam provisions] is simply to hold out to a confederate a
strong temptation to betray his coconspirator, and bring him to justice. The bill offers, in short,
a reward to the informer who comes into court and betrays his coconspirator.… I have based
the … sections upon the old-fashion idea of holding out a temptation, and ‘setting a rogue to
catch a rogue,’ which is the safest and most expeditious way I have ever discovered of bringing
rogues to justice.”). These incentives for private parties to bring suit under the FCA have wav-
ered drastically over the years. SeeHelmer & Neff, supra note 27, at 36–44.
64. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A)–(B) (2006).
65. See, e.g., Schindler Elevator Corp. v. United States ex rel. Kirk, 131 S. Ct. 1885, 1894
(2011). See generally Zachary A. Kitts, Public Trust and the Role of Qui Tam Relators in the Regula-
tory Framework, 7 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 1, 16–20 (2010); Robert L. Vogel, The Public Disclosure
Bar Against Qui Tam Suits, 24 PUB. CONT. L.J. 477, 513–14 (1995).
66. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(2) (2006).
67. Id. § 3730(d)(2)–(3).
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of the amount recovered, “depending upon the extent to which the person
substantially contributed to the prosecution of the action.”68 These amounts
can be quite significant. In a recent case, a relator received a $56 million
share of the settlement.69
The FCA’s qui tam provisions were originally needed because the Federal
Government did not have the infrastructure to investigate and prosecute
fraud against it.70 In 1863, neither the Department of Justice nor the Federal
Bureau of Investigation existed.71 And there was a perception that officials
tasked with enforcement had shirked their duty.72 Today the qui tam provi-
sions are commonly understood as addressing the difficulty of detecting
fraud against the Government.73 Many FCA cases are brought by current or
former employees of government contractors who have inside knowledge of
fraudulent acts.74
The Act’s qui tam provisions have arguably influenced judicial interpreta-
tion of the Act’s substantive provisions. Many FCA claims are brought by
aggrieved employees, and one often finds such claims appended to or filed
after employment claims.75 As the employment bar has adapted the FCA to
its own purposes, courts have responded with strategies to sort out and dis-
miss more frivolous claims at an early stage of litigation.76 The results, we
68. Id. § 3730(d)(1).
69. See Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Amerigroup to End Appeal and Pay $225 Million to
United States and Illinois to Settle Pregnancy Discrimination Case 3 (Aug. 14, 2008), available
at http://www.justice.gov/usao/iln/pr/chicago/2008/pr0814_01.pdf; see also United States ex rel.
Tyson v. Amerigroup Ill., Inc., 488 F. Supp. 2d 719, 737–42 (N.D. Ill. 2007).
70. See Sara Sun Beale, Federalizing Crime: Assessing the Impact on Federal Courts, 543 ANNALS
AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 39, 40 (1996).
71. Id. at 44.
72. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 37-50, at 47 (1863) (“[I]t is a matter of regret that punishment
has not been meted out to the basest class of transgressors. They to whom this duty belonged
seemed sadly to have neglected it …. The leniency of the government towards these men is a
marvel which the present cannot appreciate and history never explain.”).
73. See S. REP. NO. 99-345, at 3–4 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 5268–69
(“[M]ost fraud goes undetected due to the failure of Governmental agencies to effectively ensure
accountability on the part of program recipients and Government contractors …. Detecting
fraud is usually very difficult without the cooperation of individuals who are either close observ-
ers or otherwise involved in the fraudulent activity.”); U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE,
AFMD-81-57, FRAUD IN GOVERNMENT PROGRAMS: HOW EXTENSIVE IS IT? HOW CAN IT BE CON-
TROLLED? 46–47 (1981) (concluding that fraud against government programs was pervasive yet
seldom detected and rarely prosecuted due to the difficulty of obtaining information and weak-
nesses in both investigative and litigative tools); SEC v. Kearns, 691 F. Supp. 2d 601, 613 (D.N.J.
2010) (“The government’s resources, even assuming they are massive as compared to a private
person, cannot be unleashed against a fraudulent party until the government is able, with due
diligence, to detect the fraud.”).
74. Jeffrey A. Lovitky, Qui Tam Litigation: A Practical Primer, TRIAL, Jan. 1999, at 68, 69.
75. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Wilson v. Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc., 525 F.3d 370, 375
(4th Cir. 2008); United States ex rel. Mathews v. HealthSouth Corp., 332 F.3d 293, 294 (5th
Cir. 2003); United States ex rel. Lujan v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 67 F.3d 242, 244 (9th Cir. 1995).
76. The FCA is structured so that the Department of Justice can also play such a gatekeeping
role. The Act requires that the complaint be served on the DOJ, after which the DOJ can, inter
alia, move to have it dismissed. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(2), (c)(2)(A) (2006). Based on information
gathered in 1996, William Kovacic concluded that the DOJ had largely abdicated that role.
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will argue, have not always been happy. In their efforts to deal with marginal
FCA claims, courts have occasionally announced rules that make little or no
sense in the context of the FCA as a whole.77 While one rarely finds these
rules applied to dismiss more meritorious FCA claims, they have led to doc-
trinal confusion.
B. A Theory of the False Claims Act
As we observed in the Introduction, the False Claims Act is of theoretical
interest as an exception to the rule that punitive damages are generally not
available for a breach of contract, even where that breach involves fraud in
the performance.78 The best explanation for this exception lies in the theory
of contractual duties to cooperate in recovery.79
Contracts impose on parties both first-order duties and second-order du-
ties.80 A party’s first-order contractual duty is her legal duty to perform—
her obligation to provide the goods or services or to perform the acts or
forbearances to which she has agreed. Her second-order duties are those she
incurs if she breaches a first-order duty, such as the obligation to pay dam-
ages. Contracts sometimes impose duties on a party that are designed to
make it easier for the other side to learn of and recover for the other’s first-
order breaches.81 Examples include a contractual duty to produce and pre-
serve records of performance, a duty to permit audits or share information
about performance, and a duty not to hide breach or otherwise obstruct
recovery. These are contractual duties to cooperate in recovery, or “duties to
cooperate” for short. In a contract between A and B, A’s contractual duty to
cooperate is a contractual duty whose purpose is to make it easier, in case of
A’s first-order breach, for B to enforce A’s second-order duties.
When a government contract requires a private party to expressly certify its
compliance with the contract or with relevant statutes or regulations, that
duty is a duty to cooperate. By certifying compliance, the contractor effectively
tells the Government that the Government need not resort to any remedies it
might have for breach, such as withholding payments. The certification, when
honestly made, lowers the Government’s monitoring costs and increases the
chances that the Government will discover any failure to perform.
The DOJ appears, in effect, to have adopted a policy of seeking dismissal of a qui tam suit
only where there is a jurisdictional flaw in the relator’s suit—for example, reliance on publicly
available information. There has been only a single reported instance in which the DOJ has
sought to dismiss a qui tam suit on the ground that the suit lacked substantive merit or other-
wise contradicted the interests of the United States.
William Kovacic, Whistleblower Bounty Lawsuits as Monitoring Devices in Government Contracting,
29 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1799, 1818 (1996).
77. See infra Part IV.
78. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 355 (1981).
79. This theory is more fully described in Klass, Contracting for Cooperation, supra note 2.
80. See id. at 5–8.
81. See id. at 10–13, 31–32.
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The False Claims Act is needed because contract remedies alone under-
deter breach of duties to cooperate, because courts have been reluctant to ex-
tend the common law of fraud to cover such breaches, and because it is often
especially difficult for the Government to monitor performance.
Contract remedies for breach are insufficient because they are limited to
compensatory measures.82 If the only remedy for the breach of a duty to coop-
erate is compensation for harms caused, a government contractor in breach
risks nothing by submitting a false certification of compliance. If the false certi-
fication harms the Government, it is by preventing it from learning of the first-
order breach, thereby causing the Government to pay a claim it does not owe.
In order to show that harm and that the certification was false, the Government
must be able to prove the first-order breach. But in that case, the Government
can recover for the first-order breach, and the false certification has caused it no
harm. Compensatory damages for obstructive breach generate a catch-22: a
plaintiff can show obstructive harm only if she has not suffered that harm.83
These limitations of the compensatory remedies available in contract
would not be fatal if courts were willing to impose liability in tort for fraud
in the performance. A knowingly false certification of compliance is a lie.
The availability of punitive damages for the fraud would impose costs on the
breaching party over and above those it must pay anyway for the first-order
breach, breaking out of the catch-22.
But U.S. courts have been reluctant to impose liability in fraud for acts
that are also breaches of a contract.84 Courts in several states apply the eco-
nomic loss rule to bar actions for fraud except where the alleged misrepre-
sentation is “independent from the acts that breached the contract.”85 Other
courts reach similar conclusions by holding simply that there must be “a
breach of duty which is collateral or extraneous to the contract,” that the
fraudulent acts must be “separate and distinct” from the breach of contract,
or that the plaintiff ’s losses “must include actual damages … in addition to
those attributable to the breach.”86 Such rules often prevent recovery in tort
for falsely certifying compliance with contract terms.
82. For a more detailed account of the argument presented in this paragraph, see id. at 15–18.
83. The above argument skips over a few subtleties. The breach of a duty to cooperate can
delay recovery and prevent mitigation, increasing the nonbreaching party’s losses and increasing
a damage award should the breach be discovered. But the promisor pays those damages only if
the breach is discovered. In many cases, obstructive breach remains a good bet. See id. at 18–22.
84. For a more detailed discussion of these cases, see id. at 45–49.
85. HTP, Ltd. v. Lineas Aereas Costarricenses, S.A., 685 So. 2d 1238, 1239 (Fla. 1996). See
generally Jean Braucher, Deception, Economic Loss and Mass-Market Consumers: Consumer Protection
Statutes as Persuasive Authority in the Common Law of Fraud, 48 ARIZ. L. REV. 829, 836–49 (2006);
Steven C. Tourek et al., Bucking the “Trend”: The Uniform Commercial Code, the Economic Loss
Doctrine, and Common Law Causes of Action for Fraud and Misrepresentation, 84 IOWA L. REV. 875
(1999); R. Joseph Barton, Note, Drowning in a Sea of Contract: Application of the Economic Loss
Rule to Fraud and Negligent Misrepresentation Claims, 41 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1789 (2000).
86. Americana Petroleum Corp. v. Northville Indus. Corp., 606 N.Y.S.2d 906, 908 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1994); Cimino v. FirsTier Bank, 530 N.W.2d 606, 613 (Neb. 1995); Textron Fin.
Corp. v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 684 N.E.2d 1261, 1271 (Ohio Ct. App. 1996).
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The False Claims Act does an end-run around these doctrines. By grant-
ing the Government a statutory right to treble damages and per-claim
fines,87 the Act allows the Government to contract for effective duties to
cooperate in recovery, in the form of express certifications of compliance.
The FCA’s extracompensatory remedies hopefully make it a bad bet for a
contractor to falsely certify compliance with duties that it has in fact
breached.88 Contractually required certifications of compliance thereby
reduce the Government’s costs of monitoring for compliance and recovering
for breach.
And the Government has a special need for such mechanisms. First,
government employees and organizations tasked with monitoring perfor-
mance sometimes do a relatively poor job of it.89 In the extreme case, agency
employees might have participated in defrauding the Government. Less dra-
matically, but perhaps more commonly, agencies can be captured by compa-
nies whom they are tasked to monitor.90 An agency might also worry that ex-
posing waste will lead to decreased funding in future years. And there is
simple incompetence, inattention, and relative lack of resources.91 Second,
the structure of many government contracts makes breach especially difficult
to detect. Unlike contracts between private parties, many government con-
tracts include material terms that are not aimed at securing the highest-
quality goods or services at the lowest price.92 Government contracts include
ownership and hiring requirements, labor standards, environmental man-
dates, and other regulatory and statutory compliance terms that increase
costs without directly affecting the quality of the goods or services ten-
dered.93 Because the breach or performance of such duties does not manifest
87. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a) (Supp. III 2009).
88. In fact, the FCA does the theory of duties to cooperate one better by providing that viola-
tors can reduce their liability by reporting their violations. Id. § 3729(a)(2). A static penalty for
failure to cooperate in recovery means that once a party breaches her duty to cooperate, she has
a reason to continue in her noncooperative behavior: to avoid that penalty. The FCA’s dynamic
penalties give a government contractor who first fails to cooperate in recovery a reason to
change its ways.
89. It was evidence of the military’s and DOJ’s inattention to serious fraud that caused Con-
gress in 1986 to strengthen the FCA’s qui tam provisions. Helmer & Neff, supra note 27, at 40–
45 (describing the role in the passage of the 1986 amendments of Gravitt v. General Electric, 680
F. Supp. 1162 (S.D. Ohio 1988), appeal dismissed, 848 F.2d 190 (6th Cir. 1988)). For a general
discussion of the agency problems involved in government bureaucracy, see SUSAN ROSE-ACKER-
MAN, CORRUPTION: A STUDY IN POLITICAL ECONOMY 85–188 (1978).
90. See, e.g., Richard Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L.
REV. 1669 (1975); Thomas Merrill, Capture Theory and the Courts: 1967–1983, 72 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 1039, 1039–74 (1997).
91. See Kovacic, supra note 76, at 1822–25.
92. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER M. MCCRUDDEN, BUYING SOCIAL JUSTICE: EQUALITY, GOVERNMENT
PROCUREMENT, AND LEGAL CHANGE 3, 20 (2007) (discussing the use by governments of their
purchasing power to participate in the market while regulating it to achieve socioeconomic and
political goals). McCrudden specifically discusses protecting national industry through the Buy
American Act, id. at 26–27; ensuring fair wages, id. at 37–42; and promoting affirmative action
in employment, id. at 131–57.
93. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Holder v. Special Devices, Inc., 296 F. Supp. 2d 1167, 1177
(C.D. Cal. 2003) (discussing materiality of compliance with environmental and labor regulations
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itself in the performance the Government receives, compliance with them is
especially difficult for the Government to observe. Finally, the Government
often pays for services rendered to third parties or to the public at large.94
Where this is the case, it can be difficult for the Government to monitor
even whether the goods or services have been provided, much less whether
they have been provided in compliance with contract specifications.
Because it is often difficult for it to observe breach, the Government is in
special need of effective mechanisms to contract for cooperation. The FCA’s
provisions for express certification address that need. If a contracting agency
is worried about its ability to monitor performance, it can demand that the
contractor expressly certify its compliance, thereby triggering the Act’s ex-
tracompensatory remedies.95 This is not to say that the FCA is the only pos-
sible solution to the monitoring and reporting problem. Criminal penalties96
might serve as well as civil ones, though criminal fraud typically comes with
heightened scienter requirements,97 always a heavier burden of proof,98 and
never today with qui tam prosecutions.99 Alternatively, in the absence of the
FCA, courts might have developed the common law of fraud to achieve
some of the same results. In fact, one of us has argued elsewhere that the
common law should move in this direction for contracts between private
parties.100 While the relative merits of these different approaches present an
interesting question of theory, in practice the existence of the False Claims
Act obviates the need for such alternatives.
in government contract). For requirements regarding contractors’ labor practices, see FAR
subpts. 22.1–22.6 (2010); 41 U.S.C. §§ 6501–6511 (Supp. IV 2010) (labor standards for manu-
facturing contractors); 40 U.S.C. §§ 3141–3148 (2006) (formerly 40 U.S.C. § 276a) (labor stan-
dards for construction contractors); 41 U.S.C. §§ 6701–6707 (Supp. IV. 2010) (labor standards
for service contracts). For environmental requirements, see FAR pt. 23 (2010). For requirements
regarding hiring practices see Exec. Order No. 11,246, 30 Fed. Reg. 12,319 (Sept. 28, 1965) (re-
quiring contractors to “take affirmative action to ensure that applicants are employed, and that
employees are treated during employment, without regard to their race, color, religion, sex or
national origin”), and Exec. Order No. 11,141, 29 Fed. Reg. 2,477 (Feb. 15, 1964) (“[C]ontrac-
tors and subcontractors engaged in the performance of Federal contracts shall not, in connec-
tion with the employment, advancement, or discharge of employees, or in connection with the
terms, conditions, or privileges of their employment, discriminate against persons because of
their age …”).
94. Two examples that generate many FCA cases are the Medicare and Medicaid programs.
95. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1) (Supp. III 2009).
96. 18 U.S.C. § 287 (2006).
97. See SEC v. Palmisano, 135 F.3d 860, 864–66 (2d Cir. 1998).
98. See United States v. Yermian, 468 U.S. 63, 64 (1984) (holding that to establish criminal
false or fraudulent statement the “Government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the
statement was made with knowledge of falsity”); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970) (“Lest
there remain any doubt about the constitutional stature of the reasonable-doubt standard, we
explicitly hold that the Due Process Clause protects the accused against conviction except upon
proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is
charged.”).
99. See Robert K. Hoffman et al., The Civil False Claims Act, in BRIEFING PAPERS, Sept. 2001,
at 1, 11 (describing criminal FCA actions as parallel to qui tam civil actions).
100. Klass, Contracting for Cooperation, supra note 2.
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III. THE LAWOF IMPLIED CERTIFICATION
The theory of contracting for cooperation explains why the False Claims
Act imposes treble damages and other penalties for false certifications of
compliance with government contracts. It does not yet explain the judicially
created rule that the mere act of requesting payment might implicitly repre-
sent such compliance for the purpose of assessing FCA liability. This Part
starts in on that project. The first section reconstructs the history of the im-
plied certification doctrine, distinguishes several different implied certifica-
tion rules, and discusses the existing circuit split on the most important one:
implied certification of post-formation performance. The second examines
the rule’s compatibility with the text, purpose, and history of the FCA. The
third argues against one version of the rule that courts occasionally articu-
late. This sets the stage for Part IV, which provides a theory of implied certi-
fication and recommends several reforms to existing practices.
A. The Cases
This Article is about how courts determine when a claim is false or fraud-
ulent for purposes of applying the False Claims Act. The two sections of the
Act most relevant to our questions are currently codified at 31 U.S.C.
§ 3729(a)(1)(A) and (B), which we will refer to as section “(1)(A)” and
“(1)(B).”101 They provide that a person violates the FCA if she
(A) knowingly presents, or causes to be presented, a false or fraudulent
claim for payment or approval; [or]
(B) knowingly makes, uses, or causes to be made or used, a false record or
statement material to a false or fraudulent claim.102
As we noted in Part II.A, courts have distinguished three types of false certi-
fications under these sections: “factually false” claims, claims that are “legally
false” based on an express certification, and claims that are “legally false”
based on an implied certification. The line between factual falsehoods and
implicit legal falsehoods is not as analytically crisp as one might hope, a
topic we address at the end of this section. But because these are the cate-
gories courts use, we also employ them.103
Section (1)(A) prohibits factually false claims.104 A claim is factually false
if it requests payment for goods or services that have not been provided.105
101. Until 2009, these provisions were designated as sections 3729(a)(1) and (a)(2). The
change was made in Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009 (FERA), Pub. L. No. 111-
21, § 4, 123 Stat. 1617, 1621–25.
102. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(A)–(B) (Supp. III 2009).
103. See United States ex rel. Hutcheson v. Blackstone Med., Inc., No. 10-1505, 2011 WL
2150191, at *6–7 (1st Cir. June 1, 2011) (criticizing the categories used by other circuits).
104. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(A) (Supp. III 2009).
105. United States ex rel. Conner v. Salina Reg’l Health Ctr., Inc., 543 F.3d 1211, 1217 (10th
Cir. 2008); Mikes v. Straus, 274 F.3d 687, 697 (2d Cir. 2001).
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The False Claims Act was first enacted to target fraud of this type.106 During
the early years of the Civil War, there were reports of crates labeled “mus-
kets” sold to the Government that were in fact filled with sawdust and indi-
vidual horses or mules were sold to the Government several times over.107
Such false billing practices would today fall under section (1)(A)’s “false or
fraudulent claim[s].” Other examples of factually false claims include Medi-
care reimbursement requests for medical services not provided,108 double
billing for goods or services,109 invoices that overstate the purchase prices of
items for government reimbursement,110 and claims for worthless services.111
In other cases, a contractor has provided the requisite goods or services
but has violated some other contract term, statute, or regulation. While such
breaches or violations are not in themselves fraudulent, such a contractor
might commit fraud if it also certifies compliance.112 Courts designate
claims accompanied by false certifications “legally false.”113 Legally false
claims can be further divided into those in which there is an express certifica-
tion of compliance and those in which the certification is implied.
False express certifications are, from a doctrinal point of view, the easy
cases. Here a contractor expressly represents to the Government that it has
performed when it in fact is in breach, or that it has complied with a statute
or regulation that it has in fact violated. Such express falsehoods run afoul of
section (1)(B), which prohibits using or making a “false record or statement
material to a false or fraudulent claim.”114 In Roby v. Boeing, for example, a
contract for the sale of helicopters to the Army required Boeing to submit a
form certifying that the helicopters conformed to specific contract require-
ments.115 Boeing supplied the helicopters, so its requests for payment were
106. See United States v. McNinch, 356 U.S. 595, 599 (1958) (explaining that the FCA was
originally adopted based on evidence that “the United States had been billed for nonexistent or
worthless goods, charged an exorbitant price for goods delivered, and generally robbed in pur-
chasing necessities of war”).
107. Helmer & Neff, supra note 27, at 35. See also S. EXEC. DOC. NO. 37-72, at 489 (1862)
(“He cannot be looked upon as a good citizen, entitled to favorable consideration of his claim,
who seeks to augment the vast burdens, daily increasing, that are to weigh on the future industry
of the country, by demands on the Treasury for which nothing entitled to the name of an equiv-
alent has been rendered.”).
108. See, e.g., United States v. Stevens, 605 F. Supp. 2d 863, 868 (W.D. Ky. 2008); United
States ex rel. Woodruff v. Haw. Pac. Health, Civil No. 05-00521 JMS/LEK, 2007 WL
1500275, at *4–5 (D. Haw. May 21, 2007).
109. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Green v. Northrop Corp., 59 F.3d 953, 956 (9th Cir.
1995).
110. See, e.g., United States v. Neifert-White Co., 390 U.S. 228, 230 (1968).
111. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Lee v. SmithKline Beecham, Inc., 245 F.3d 1048, 1053 (9th
Cir. 2001). For examples of the limits of worthless services claims under section (A)(1), see
Luckey v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 183 F.3d 730, 732–33 (7th Cir. 1999); Sweeney v. ManorCare
Health Servs., Inc., No. C03-5320RJB, 2005WL 4030950, at *6 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 4, 2005).
112. See 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(B) (Supp. III 2009).
113. United States ex rel. Conner v. Salina Reg’l Health Ctr., Inc, 543 F.3d 1211, 1217 (10th
Cir. 2008); Mikes v. Straus, 274 F.3d 687, 696–97 (1st Cir. 2001).
114. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(B) (Supp. III 2009).
115. United States ex rel. Roby v. Boeing Co., 79 F. Supp. 2d 877, 879 (S.D. Ohio 1999).
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not factually false.116 The relator, however, alleged that the transmission
gears did not conform to the contract requirements, although Boeing had
expressly certified such compliance.117 While the breach itself was not fraud,
Boeing’s certifications may have misrepresented its performance, rendering
its claims for payment legally false.118 “Certification” is not a term of art. As
the Ninth Circuit observed:
The theory of liability … could just as easily be called the “false statement of com-
pliance with a government regulation that is a precursor to government funding”
theory, but that is not as succinct.… So long as the statement in question is know-
ingly false when made, it matters not whether it is a certification, assertion, state-
ment, or secret handshake; False Claims liability can attach.119
In express false certification cases, there are two wrongful acts: first, a con-
tractual breach or statutory or regulatory violation and, second, an express
false statement to the contrary.120
Courts also have held that the very act of submitting a claim for payment
can implicitly represent that the contractor has committed no wrong.121
They have identified two types of implied certification: implied certification
of no pre-formation fraud in the inducement and implied certification of
post-formation compliance with contract terms, statutes, or regulations.
Courts have long held that fraud in the inducement followed by a claim
for payment will support an action under the False Claims Act. In its 1943
decision in Ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, the Supreme Court considered an FCA
claim based on collusive bidding for a government contract.122 The claims
for payment were not factually false, as the defendant provided the electrical
work required by the contract.123 Nor were the requests for payment accom-
panied by express certifications regarding the formation of the contract, re-
presentations that there had been no collusive bidding or similar viola-
tions.124 Yet the Court did not hesitate to find that the collusive bidding
violated the False Claims Act: “This fraud did not spend itself with the exe-
cution of the contract. Its taint entered into every swollen estimate which
was the basic cause for payment of every dollar paid by the [Govern-
ment].”125 Since Marcus, many courts have held that claims for payments
under a government contract that has been fraudulently induced violate the
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 894.
119. United States ex rel. Hendow v. Univ. of Phx., 461 F.3d 1166, 1172 (9th Cir. 2006).
120. See id. at 1171; Rodriguez v. Our Lady of Lourdes Med. Ctr., 552 F.3d 297, 303 (3d
Cir. 2008).
121. Mikes v. Straus, 274 F.3d 687, 700 (2d Cir. 2001); Ab-Tech Constr., Inc. v. United
States, 31 Fed. Cl. 429, 434 (1994).
122. United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537, 539 (1943).
123. See id. at 542–43.
124. See id.
125. Id. at 543.
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FCA, often invoking the metaphor of an enduring taint.126 These cases
firmly establish that fraud in the inducement will support a claim under the
FCA despite the fact that the goods or services have been rendered (the
claim is not factually false) and there is no misrepresentation of compliance
(there is no false express certification). Fraud in the inducement can take any
of a number of forms, including collusive bidding,127 factual misrepresenta-
tions such as an undisclosed conflict of interest in the bidding process,128
and a misrepresented intent to perform.129
Other implied certification cases involve not pre-formation fraud in the
inducement, but post-formation breach of contract terms or violation of
governing statutes or regulations. The theory behind these cases is that the
act of submitting a claim for payment implicitly represents material compli-
ance with relevant contract terms, statutes, and regulations. Implied certifi-
cation of post-formation compliance does not have the pedigree of implied
certification of no fraud in the inducement. The doctrine is less than twenty
years old and the Supreme Court has yet to consider it. There is conse-
quently more disagreement among courts on the right rule for implied certi-
fications of compliance, and even on its validity.
The seminal case is the U.S. Court of Federal Claims’ 1994 decision in
Ab-Tech Construction v. United States.130 Ab-Tech contracted with the Small
Business Administration for the construction of a facility for the Army
Corps of Engineers pursuant to section 8(a) of the Small Business Act, which
is designed to assist minority-owned businesses.131 Though the contract sti-
pulated that Ab-Tech would not enter into any management or joint-venture
agreements without government approval, two weeks after the contract was
awarded, Ab-Tech secretly entered into an agreement that suggested it was
working as a front for a non-minority-owned business.132 Ab-Tech subse-
quently submitted claims for payment for services rendered.133 While those
126. See, e.g., Harrison v. Westinghouse Savannah River Co., 176 F.3d 776, 787 (4th Cir.
1999); United States ex rel. Siewick v. Jamieson Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 214 F.3d 1372, 1377 (D.C.
Cir. 2000); United States ex rel. Hafter v. Spectrum Emergency Care, Inc., 190 F.3d 1156, 1164
(10th Cir. 1999); United States ex rel. Hockett v. Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp., 498
F. Supp. 2d 25, 69 n.33 (D.D.C. 2007); Daewoo Eng’g & Constr. Co. v. United States, 73 Fed.
Cl. 547, 586 (Fed. Cl. 2006); United States ex rel. Perales v. St. Margaret’s Hosp., 243 F. Supp.
2d 843, 853 (C.D. Ill. 2003).
127. See, e.g., Marcus, 317 U.S. at 543; United States v. Ehrlich, 643 F.2d 634, 636 (9th Cir.
1981).
128. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Harrison v. Westinghouse Savannah River Co., 352 F.3d
908, 910–11 (4th Cir. 2003).
129. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Hendow v. Univ. of Phx., 461 F.3d 1166, 1169 (9th Cir.
2006); United States ex rel. Main v. Oakland City Univ., 426 F.3d 914, 917 (7th Cir. 2005);
United States ex rel. Tyson v. Amerigroup Ill., Inc., 488 F. Supp. 2d 719, 723 (N.D. Ill. 2007).
But see United States ex rel. Graves v. ITT Educ. Servs., Inc., 284 F. Supp. 2d 487, 503 (S.D.
Tex. 2003) (suggesting that promissory fraud is a rare basis for liability under the FCA).
130. 31 Fed. Cl. 429 (1994), aff ’d, 57 F.3d 1084 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (unpublished table
decision).
131. Id. at 431–32.
132. Id. at 433.
133. Id.
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claims were neither factually false nor accompanied by false express certifi-
cations of compliance, the court held that they “represented an implied
certification by Ab-Tech of its continuing adherence to the requirements
for participation in the 8(a) program.”134 Because Ab-Tech was in fact out of
compliance with those requirements, the implied certification was false: “In
short, the Government was duped by Ab-Tech’s active concealment of a fact
vital to the integrity of that program. The withholding of such information—
information critical to the decision to pay—is the essence of a false claim.”135
The Ab-Tech rule can be described either as an interpretive default or as a
duty to disclose. Considered as an interpretive default, the rule is that unless
a contractor says otherwise, a claim for payment represents material compli-
ance with relevant contract terms, statutes, and regulations. That default is
more or less equivalent to a duty to disclose because, in most cases, the act
of opting out of that default representation will inform the Government that
the contractor is in breach. To avoid liability under the implied certification
of compliance rule, the noncompliant contractor must disclose that it is in
material breach. Thus, the Ab-Tech court characterized the wrong at issue as
“deliberately withholding” information about its violation of the minority-
owned business rules, and explained that “[t]he withholding of such informa-
tion—information critical to the decision to pay—is the essence of a false
claim.”136 Either way, implied certification of compliance under the FCA is
at bottom a tool for getting government contractors to share information
about their performance or nonperformance—in accordance with our gen-
eral explanation of the Act in Part II.B. In the analysis below, we follow most
courts, which define the doctrine as “implied certification,” and treat the rel-
evant rules as interpretive defaults. Similar arguments would go through if
we formulated them instead as duties to disclose.137
134. Id. at 434.
135. Id. Ab-Tech was in several ways an easy case. While the court did not draw the inference,
the evidence suggested that Ab-Tech might have intended all along to serve as a front for a non-
minority-owned business. Within a month after being awarded the contract, Ab-Tech had en-
tered into a pair of agreements giving another company considerable control over the project
and a share of the profits. Id. at 433. Then, in response to the Government’s inquiries, Ab-Tech
did not disclose the entire agreement and its president lied about the existence of related bank
accounts. Id. at 432.
136. Id. at 434; see also United States v. Sci. Applications Int’l Corp., 626 F.3d 1257, 1269
(D.C. Cir. 2010) (holding that “to establish the existence of a ‘false or fraudulent’ claim on the
basis of implied certification of a contractual condition, the FCA plaintiff … must show that the
contractor withheld information about its noncompliance with material contractual require-
ments”); BMY-Combat Sys. Div. of Harsco Corp. v. United States, 38 Fed. Cl. 109, 125 (1997)
(finding a violation of the Ab-Tech rule where the contractor “withheld from the [Government]
information on [the contractor’s] noncompliance [which was] critical to the [Government’s]
decision to pay”); United States ex rel. Augustine v. Century Health Servs., Inc., 289 F.3d 409,
414–15 (6th Cir. 2002) (affirming the district court’s findings that certifications of compliance at
the time of contracting imposed on the defendant a duty to file amended reports should they
later fall out of compliance).
137. Section 3729(a)(1)(G) prohibits “knowingly conceal[ing] … an obligation to pay or
transmit money or property to the Government.” 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(G) (Supp. III 2009).
We suggest in the Conclusion that if Congress ever decides to create clearer statutory authority
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Ab-Tech articulated a relatively broad rule for implied certification of
compliance. In the years immediately following, several courts adopted simi-
larly expansive rules. In Shaw v. AAA Engineering and Drafting, the relator
argued that a photography company violated the FCA by submitting in-
voices for payment after breaching a contract term regarding the proper dis-
posal of chemicals.138 Observing that “FCA liability under § 3729(a)(1) may
arise even absent an affirmative or express false statement,” the Tenth Cir-
cuit held that the relator was required to show only that the defendant “sub-
mitted invoices for full payment on the contract knowing that it had failed to
comply with the … contract requirements.”139 In Ex rel. Bryant v. Williams
Building Corp., a case involving asbestos removal from military housing
units, the district court similarly concluded that “payment invoices repre-
sented an implied certification [by the defendant] of its continuing adherence
to all material terms.”140 And in Pickens v. Kanawha River Towing, the district
court held that “[a]n affirmative statement … is not necessary to state a cause
of action under § 3729(a)(1) of the FCA,” and that the relator therefore
needed to plead only that the defendant submitted invoices without disclos-
ing its breach of contractual terms requiring compliance with the Clean
Water Act.141
Other courts were less sympathetic to the Ab-Tech rule. In 1996, the
Ninth Circuit appeared to many to reject it entirely.142 The relator in Ex rel.
Hopper v. Anton, a teacher who also raised several employment-related
claims, alleged that her former employer had violated federal and state laws
in its special education evaluation and placement program, for which it re-
ceived federal funds.143 Without citing Ab-Tech, the Ninth Circuit affirmed
summary judgment for the defendant: “Violations of laws, rules, or regula-
tions alone do not create a cause of action under the FCA. It is the false certi-
fication of compliance which creates liability when certification is a prerequi-
site to obtaining a government benefit.”144 In Ex rel. Joslin v. Community
Home Health of Maryland,145 a Maryland district court expressed similar con-
cerns about the Ab-Tech rule:
for the judicially created rule for implied certification of compliance, the language in subsection
(1)(G) provides a starting point.
138. 213 F.3d 519, 523 (10th Cir. 2000).
139. Id. at 532–33. See also id. at 531 (“[T]he language and structure of the FCA itself sup-
ports the conclusion that, under 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1), a false implied certification may consti-
tute a ‘false or fraudulent claim.’ ”).
140. United States ex rel. Bryant v. Williams Bldg. Corp., 158 F. Supp. 2d 1001, 1010 (D.S.D.
2001).
141. 916 F. Supp. 702, 707 (S.D. Ohio 1996); see also McNutt ex rel. United States v. Haley-
ville Med. Supplies, Inc., 423 F.3d 1256, 1259 (11th Cir. 2005); S.F. Unified Sch. Dist. ex rel.
Contreras v. Laidlaw Transit, Inc., 106 Cal. Rptr. 3d 84, 94 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010).
142. United States ex rel. Hopper v. Anton, 91 F.3d 1261 (9th Cir. 1996).
143. Id. at 1263–64.
144. Id. at 1266.
145. United States ex rel. Joslin v. Cmty. Home Health of Md., 984 F. Supp. 374 (D. Md.
1997).
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To hold that the mere submission of a claim of payment, without more, always
constitutes an “implied certification” of compliance with the conditions of the
Government program seriously undermines this principle by permitting FCA lia-
bility potentially to attach every time a document or request for payment is sub-
mitted to the Government.146
To this day several circuits have expressly declined to adopt the theory of
implied certification of compliance.147
While the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Hopper is sometimes treated as a
rejection of implied certification altogether,148 read as a whole the opinion is
not so categorical.149 The court emphasized that FCA liability is especially
inappropriate “where regulatory compliance is not a sine qua non of receipt
of state funding” and where “[t]here are administrative and other remedies
for [the] regulatory violations.”150 In 2001 the Second Circuit picked up on
the former factor to craft a narrower rule for implied certification, which
several courts have since adopted.
The case, Mikes v. Straus, was brought by a physician who, after being
fired by a medical practice, alleged that his former employer violated Medi-
care regulations by failing to properly calibrate medical devices, and then
violated the FCA by submitting reimbursement claims for treatments using
those devices.151 Observing that the Ab-Tech rule did not “fit comfortably
into the health care context because the False Claims Act was not designed
for use as a blunt instrument to enforce compliance with all medical regula-
tions,”152 the Second Circuit held that “implied false certification is appro-
priately applied only when the underlying statute or regulation upon which
146. Id. at 384.
147. See United States ex rel. Steury v. Cardinal Health, Inc., 625 F.3d 262, 270 (5th Cir.
2010); United States ex rel. Marcy v. Rowan Cos., 520 F.3d 384, 389 (5th Cir. 2008); United
States ex rel. Herrera v. Danka Office Imaging Co., 91 F. App’x 862, 864–65 (4th Cir. 2004);
Harrison v. Westinghouse Savannah River Co., 176 F.3d 776, 786 n.8 (4th Cir. 1999); United
States ex rel. Willard v. Humana Health Plan of Tex., Inc., 336 F.3d 375, 382 (5th Cir. 2003).
See also United States ex rel. Bennett v. Bos. Scientific Corp., No. H-07-2467, 2011 WL
1231577, at *13 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 31, 2011) (describing implied certification theories but noting
they were never adopted in the Fifth Circuit); United States ex rel. Stebner v. Stewart & Steven-
son Servs., Inc., 305 F. Supp. 2d 694, 700 (S.D. Tex. 2004) (adopting a narrow view of implied
certification as existing only where “the invoice represents that the contractor has disclosed defi-
ciencies or nonconformance areas”).
148. See, e.g., Shaw v. AAA Eng’g & Drafting, Inc., 213 F.3d 519, 532–33 (10th Cir. 2000); In
re Pharm. Indus. Average Wholesale Price Litig., 491 F. Supp. 2d 12, 17 (D. Mass. 2007);
United States ex rel. Swan v. Covenant Care, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 2d 1212, 1216 n.3 (E.D. Cal.
2002) (suggesting that the Ninth Circuit has not adopted the implied certification theory). But
see United States ex rel. Holder v. Special Devices, Inc., 296 F. Supp. 2d 1167, 1175–76 (C.D.
Cal. 2003) (reading Hopper narrowly and distinguishing it from a case where payment was ex-
pressly conditioned on compliance).
149. In 2006, the Ninth Circuit suggested that the viability of the implied certification theory
remained an open question for it. United States ex rel. Hendow v. Univ. of Phx., 461 F.3d 1166,
1172 n.1 (9th Cir. 2006). Last year it “join[ed] our sister circuits in recognizing a theory of im-
plied certification under the FCA.” Ebeid ex rel. United States v. Lungwitz, 616 F.3d 993, 996
(9th Cir. 2010).
150. United States ex rel. Hopper v. Anton, 91 F.3d 1261, 1267 (9th Cir. 1996).
151. Mikes v. Straus, 274 F.3d 687, 692–93 (2d Cir. 2001).
152. Id. at 699.
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the plaintiff relies expressly states the provider must comply in order to be
paid.”153 We call this the “compliance-condition rule.” According to the
compliance-condition rule, a request for payment implicitly certifies compli-
ance with only those contract terms, statutes, or regulations that condition
payment on the contractor’s compliance with them.154 The Mikes opinion
states that the rule is an interpretive one.155 It does not provide a separate
materiality requirement but determines when “instances of regulatory non-
compliance will cause a claim to be false.”156 The court concluded that
because the relevant provisions of the Medicare statute did not expressly
condition payment on compliance, the defendants could not be held liable
under the implied certification theory.157
It is important to distinguish the compliance-condition rule from what
we will call the “certification-condition rule.” Several courts have held or
suggested that “a false certification of compliance with a statute or regula-
tion cannot serve as the basis for a qui tam action under the FCA unless pay-
ment is conditioned on that certification.”158 As we discuss in the third section
153. Id. at 700. See also United States ex rel. Kirk v. Schindler Elevator Corp., 601 F.3d 94,
114–15 (2d Cir. 2010) (reaffirming rule from Mikes), rev’d on other grounds, 131 S. Ct. 1885
(2011). This compliance-condition rule does not apply to implied certification cases involving
fraud in the inducement. In these cases the question is whether the defendant would have been
awarded the contract absent the misrepresentation. United States ex rel. Tyson v. Amerigroup
Ill., Inc., 488 F. Supp. 2d 719, 726 (N.D. Ill. 2007).
154. Mikes, 274 F.3d at 700.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 697. Other courts have read the Mikes rule as imposing a heightened materiality
requirement on plaintiffs who allege implied certification. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Marcy
v. Rowan Cos., 520 F.3d 384, 389 (5th Cir. 2008) (suggesting that the compliance-condition
rule provides the test for materiality under section (a)(2), now section (1)(A)).
157. Mikes, 274 F.3d at 701–02.
158. United States ex rel. Siewick v. Jamieson Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 214 F.3d 1372, 1376 (D.C.
Cir. 2000) (citing United States ex rel. Hopper v. Anton, 91 F.3d 1261, 1266 (9th Cir. 1996))
(emphasis added); see also United States ex rel. Thompson v. Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp.,
125 F.3d 899, 902 (5th Cir. 1997) (“[W]here the government has conditioned payment of a
claim upon a claimant’s certification of compliance with, for example, a statute or regulation, a
claimant submits a false or fraudulent claim when he or she falsely certifies compliance with that
statute or regulation.”); United States ex rel. Swan v. Covenant Care, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 2d 1212,
1221 (E.D. Cal. 2002); United States ex rel. Graves v. ITT Educ. Servs., Inc., 284 F. Supp. 2d
487, 501–02 (S.D. Tex. 2003) (applying the certification-condition rule to dismiss complaint);
United States ex rel. Joslin v. Cmty. Home Health of Md., Inc., 984 F. Supp. 374, 385 (D. Md.
1997) (declining to recognize implied certification theory but holding that if it did, the com-
plaint would fail the certification-condition test). Mikes itself cites these cases and announced
something like a similar rule: “a claim under the Act is legally false only where a party certifies
compliance with a statute or regulation as a condition to government payment.” 274 F.3d at
697. This is, however, dicta, as the court observed that the express certifications at issue were
simply not false under the facts alleged. Id. at 699.
Several courts have held that a false certification need not be contractually required or a con-
dition of payment to support an FCA claim. United States ex rel. Bryant v. Williams Bldg.
Corp., 158 F. Supp. 2d 1001, 1004, 1009 (D.S.D. 2001) (daily quality control reports not re-
quired by construction contract); BMY-Combat Sys. Div. of Harsco Corp. v. United States, 38
Fed. Cl. 109, 126–27 (1997) (internal records not delivered to the Government prior to payment
but used after payment to hide breach).
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of this Part, it is unclear from the cases whether the certification-condition
rule is meant to apply to claims of express certification, to claims of implied
certification, or to both, though the rule has very different implications in
these different contexts.159 For the moment, we merely note the difference
between the two rules. While the compliance-condition rule holds that
there is an implied certification only where payment is expressly conditioned
on compliance with a contract term, statute, or regulation, the condition-
certification rule suggests that some FCA claims require payment to be con-
ditioned on the certification of such compliance.160
The compliance-condition rule is arguably on its way to becoming the
majority rule. A number of courts have followedMikes’s holding with respect
to compliance with statutes or regulations.161 Others have extended the rule
to include implied certification of compliance with contract terms.162 Susan
159. See infra Part III.C.
160. Courts and commentators do not always clearly distinguish between the two rules. In
United States ex rel. Hendow v. University of Phoenix, for example, the Ninth Circuit emphasized
the certification-condition rule in its discussion of governing law, 461 F.3d 1166, 1172–73 (9th
Cir. 2006), but when it turned to the facts of the case, the court concluded that the action could
go forward because “compliance with the [statute] is a necessary condition of continued eligibility
and participation,” id. at 1176 (emphasis added). See also Graves, 284 F. Supp. 2d at 497; Levy
et al., supra note 6, at 143–44.
161. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Augustine v. Century Health Servs., Inc., 289 F.3d 409,
415 (6th Cir. 2002) (“[L]iability can attach if the claimant violates its continuing duty to comply
with the regulations on which payment is conditioned.”); Ebeid ex rel. United States v. Lung-
witz, 616 F.3d 993, 998 (9th Cir. 2010) (“Implied false certification occurs when an entity has
previously undertaken to expressly comply with a law, rule, or regulation, and that obligation is
implicated by submitting a claim for payment even though a certification of compliance is not
required in the process of submitting the claim.”); United States ex rel. Conner v. Salina
Reg’l Health Ctr., Inc., 543 F.3d 1211, 1218 (10th Cir. 2008) (“Under the implied certification
theory … the analysis focuses on the underlying contracts, statutes, or regulations themselves to
ascertain whether they make compliance a prerequisite to the government’s payment.”); United
States v. Sci. Applications Int’l Corp., 626 F.3d 1257, 1269 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (“[T]o establish the
existence of a ‘false or fraudulent’ claim on the basis of implied certification of a contractual con-
dition, the FCA plaintiff … must show that the contractor withheld information about its non-
compliance with material contractual requirements.”); United States ex rel. Swafford v. Borgess
Med. Ctr., 98 F. Supp. 2d 822, 831 (W.D. Mich. 2000) (“[A]n implied false certification theory
can succeed only where the defendant’s compliance with statutory or regulatory authority is so
essential for reimbursement that, if the government had been aware of the defendant’s non-
compliance, it would have refused payment.”); United States ex rel. Woodruff v. Haw. Pac.
Health, Civil No. 05-00521 JMS/LEK, 2007 WL 1500275, at *7 (D. Haw. May 21, 2007)
(dismissing FCA claims where plaintiff failed to allege that statute, regulation, or agreement ex-
plicitly conditioned participation and payment on compliance). See also United States ex rel.
Willard v. Humana Health Plan of Tex. Inc., 336 F.3d 375, 382–83 (5th Cir. 2003) (indicating
that if it were to adopt the implied certification theory, the court would adopt the compliance-
condition rule); United States ex rel. Lee v. Fairview Health Sys., No. Civ.02-270 RHK/SRN,
2004 WL 1638252, at *3 (D. Minn. July 22, 2004) (“[I]mplied false certification is viable only
when the underlying Federal statute or regulation provides that compliance is a condition or
prerequisite of payment.”) (dicta).
162. United States ex rel. Coppock v. Northrop Grumman Corp., No. Civ.A.3:98-CV-2143-
D, 2003 WL 21730668, at *13 (N.D. Tex. July 22, 2003); United States ex rel. Holder v. Special
Devices, Inc., 296 F. Supp. 2d 1167, 1176–77 (C.D. Cal. 2003) (distinguishing Hopper on the
grounds that the contracts at issue specifically stated that the defendant was required to comply
with the Clean Air and Clean Water Acts).
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Levy, Daniel Winters, and John Richards have recently argued that the
compliance-condition test is the right narrowing principle for a wide variety
of implied certification claims, and that it rationalizes much of the case law
under the FCA.163
But the compliance-condition rule has generated a new set of questions.
One concerns whether the contract, statute, or regulation must expressly con-
dition payment on compliance. While Mikes emphasized the need for
express language,164 last year in United States v. Science Applications Interna-
tional Corp.,165 the D.C. Circuit reached a different conclusion:
[T]o establish the existence of a “false or fraudulent” claim on the basis of implied
certification of a contractual condition, the FCA plaintiff … must show that the
contractor withheld information about its noncompliance with material contrac-
tual requirements. The existence of express contractual language specifically link-
ing compliance to eligibility for payment may well constitute dispositive evidence
of materiality, but it is not … a necessary condition. The plaintiff may establish
materiality in other ways, such as through testimony demonstrating that both par-
ties to the contract understood that payment was conditional on compliance with
the requirement at issue.166
Though the court expressed the rule in terms of materiality, it is better
understood as specifying what a claim implicitly represents for purposes of
FCA liability.167
A second question concerns just how strict the condition must be: Is com-
pliance conditional if the Government might have paid the claim even if it
had known of the violation? It is clear that if the Government would have
had a duty to pay even had it known of the violation, there is no FCA viola-
tion.168 But several courts have gone further to hold that where the Govern-
ment has discretion to pay despite the violation, compliance is not a condition
of payment and there is no implied certification. In Ex rel. Marcy v. Rowan,
for example, the Fifth Circuit considered a drilling lease that was “subject to
cancellation” for the contractor’s environmental violations.169 The court
held that because “nothing in the lease requires cancellation or otherwise de-
nies benefits to the Defendants” on the basis of the violations, the environ-
mental requirements “were not prerequisites to continuation of the lease” and
163. Levy, Winters, and Richards see less divergence in the case law than we do. Levy et al.,
supra note 6, at 143–52. We would read their article as reformist rather than descriptive.
164. Mikes v. Straus, 274 F.3d 687, 700 (2d Cir. 2001).
165. 626 F.3d 1257 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
166. Id. at 1269; see also United States ex rel. Hutcheson v. Blackstone Medical, Inc., No. 10-
1505, 2011 WL 2150191, at *9 (1st Cir. June 1, 2011) (adopting the Science Applications rule in a
case alleging a kickback scheme for Medicare providers).
167. As the Fifth Circuit recently observed (adopting a different rule), “[t]he prerequisite
requirement has to do with more than just the materiality of a false certification; it ultimately
has to do with whether it is fair to find a false certification or false claim for payment in the first
place.” United States ex rel. Steury v. Cardinal Health, Inc., 625 F.3d 262, 269 (5th Cir. 2010).
168. SeeUnited States v. Southland Mgmt. Corp., 326 F.3d 669, 677 (5th Cir. 2003) (holding
that claims for funds to which defendants were entitled, despite violations, are not false claims
under the FCA).
169. United States ex rel. Marcy v. Rowan, 520 F.3d 384, 389 (5th Cir. 2008).
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therefore could not support an implied certification claim.170 The district
court in Ex rel. Coppock v. Northrop Grumman similarly dismissed a claim
because the relator had failed “to allege that failure to certify statutory or con-
tractual compliance would necessarily have resulted in termination of the
leases.”171 The Tenth Circuit, however, has adopted the opposite rule under
the rubric of materiality. In United States ex rel. Lemmon v. Envirocare of Utah it
concluded that “materiality does not require a plaintiff to show conclusively
that, were it aware of the falsity, the government would not have paid. Rather,
it requires only a showing that the government may not have paid.”172 Other
courts have similarly permitted claims to go forward even where it appears
that the Government had discretion to pay despite the violation.173
Yet a third question concerns the scope of the condition: must compliance
be a condition of payment for the goods or services rendered, or is it enough
that it is a condition of participation in the contract? Ab-Tech held that the
defendant had implicitly certified its “continuing adherence to the require-
ments for participation” in the SBA’s minority-owned business program.174
Mikes, however, distinguished conditions of participation from conditions of
payment, holding that a claim against Medicare implies compliance with
express conditions of payment, but not with conditions of participation in
the program.175
A number of courts have followed Mikes and especially in Medicare cases
distinguish between conditions of payment and conditions of participa-
tion.176 Others have rejected the distinction. In Hendow v. University of Phoe-
170. Id. at 389–90 (emphasis added); see also United States ex rel. Steury v. Cardinal Health,
Inc., 625 F.3d 262, 270 (5th Cir. 2010) (reaffirming the reasoning in Marcy). In both Marcy and
subsequent cases, the Fifth Circuit has used this reasoning to avoid deciding whether to recog-
nize the implied certification doctrine.
171. United States ex rel. Coppock v. Northrop Grumman Corp., No. Civ.A.3:988-CV-
2143-D, 2003 WL 21730668, at *12 (N.D. Tex. July 22, 2003). The above statement applies to
contractually required compliance with environmental regulations. The Coppock court held that
contractual terms involving usage of a property were a prerequisite to a grant of rent credits,
and therefore could serve as the basis for an implied certification claim. Id. at *13.
172. 614 F.3d 1163, 1170 (10th Cir. 2010); see United States ex rel. Sanchez-Smith v. AHS
Tulsa Reg’l Med. Ctr., 754 F. Supp. 2d 1270, 1297–98 (N.D. Okla. 2010) (discussing Lemmon).
173. See, e.g., BMY-Combat Sys. Div. of Harsco Corp. v. United States, 38 Fed. Cl. 109, 115
(1997) (contractor asked Government to waive compliance with term after discovery of violation).
174. Ab-Tech Constr., Inc. v. United States, 31 Fed. Cl. 429, 434 (1994).
175. Mikes v. Straus, 274 F.3d 687, 702 (2d Cir. 2001) (“Since [the Medicare statute] does
not expressly condition payment on compliance with its terms, defendants’ certifications … are
not legally false.”).
176. United States ex rel. Willard v. Humana Health Plan of Tex. Inc., 336 F.3d 375, 382–83
(5th Cir. 2003); United States ex rel. Conner v. Salina Reg’l Health Ctr., Inc., 543 F.3d 1211,
1222 (10th Cir. 2008); United States ex rel. Woodruff v. Haw. Pac. Health, Civil No. 05-00521
JMS/LEK, 2007 WL 1500275, at *6–8 (D. Haw. May 21, 2007); Sweeney v. ManorCare Health
Servs., Inc., No. C03-5320RJB, 2005 WL 4030950, at *5 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 4, 2005); see also
Conner, 543 F.3d at 1222 (recognizing that the distinction between conditions of payment and
conditions of participation might be more relevant in the Medicare context than elsewhere);
United States ex rel. Steury v. Cardinal Health, Inc., 625 F.3d 262, 268–70 (5th Cir. 2010) (sug-
gesting that if the Fifth Circuit were to adopt an implied certification rule, it would require that
payment be conditioned on compliance).
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nix, the Ninth Circuit labeled the participation-payment division a “distinc-
tion without a difference.”177 Emphasizing that the defendant university
had expressly promised to comply with federal regulations that prohibited
incentive-based payments to its recruiters, the court reasoned that “[i]f such
promises were not conditions of payment, the University would be virtually
unfettered in its ability to receive funds from the government while flout-
ing the law.”178 Similarly, in Ex rel. Tyson v. Amerigroup Illinois, the district
court, affirming a jury finding of implied false certification, concluded that
each time the HMO defendant filed a Medicare payment claim, it falsely re-
presented that it was complying with the requirement that it not discriminate
in enrolling participants based on the need for health services, a requirement
of participation in the Illinois Medicare program.179 Reasoning that “[a] con-
dition of participation is a condition of payment,” the court held:
The question is whether Defendants would have been awarded the contracts and
been paid or allowed to keep their contracts with [the Government if the Govern-
ment] knew that they were discriminating against pregnant and ill indivi-
duals …. Plaintiffs are not required to provide that the false claims were “informa-
tion crucial to the decision to pay” or identify a federal regulation that “expressly
state[s] the provider must comply in order to be paid.”180
And in Ex rel. Augustine v. Century Health Services, the Sixth Circuit upheld a
finding of implied certification based on a breach of Medicare conditions of
participation related to the funding of employee pension programs where
the defendant had truthfully certified compliance, was required to amend
such certifications to reflect any changes, later fell out of compliance, and
then failed to amend.181
Finally, we note that while there is universal agreement that factually false
claims violate the FCA and disagreement about whether a claim represents
compliance, the line between factual falsehoods and implicit legal falsehoods
is not as analytically sharp as one might wish. While courts have said that a
factual falsehood is, in essence, billing for goods or services not provided,182
177. United States ex rel. Hendow v. Univ. of Phx., 461 F.3d 1166, 1176 (9th Cir. 2006); see
also Woodruff, 2007 WL 1500275, at *7 (concluding that “Hendow distinguishes Mikes; it does
not disfavor its holding”); Conner, 543 F.3d at 1222 (distinguishing the Medicare context from
Title IV loan program).
178. Hendow, 461 F.3d at 1176.
179. United States ex rel. Tyson v. Amerigroup Ill., 488 F. Supp. 2d 719 (N.D. Ill. 2007).
180. Id. at 726 (quotingMikes, 274 F.2d at 700).
181. United States ex rel. Augustine v. Century Health Servs., 289 F.3d 409, 415 (6th Cir.
2002). In addition to the cases discussed in the above paragraph, see United States ex rel.
McNutt v. Haleyville Med. Supplies, Inc., 423 F.3d 1256, 1257 (11th Cir. 2005) (Medicare pro-
vider’s nondisclosed noncompliance with Anti-Kickback Law violated FCA); Gublo v. Nova-
Care, Inc., 62 F. Supp. 2d 347, 355 (D. Mass. 1999) (assuming that a falsehood concerning a
condition of participation violates the FCA); In re Pharm. Indus. Average Wholesale Price
Litig., 491 F. Supp. 2d 12, 18 (D. Mass. 2007) (finding that Medicaid claims impliedly certified
compliance with anti-kickback statute).
182. Conner, 543 F.3d at 1217;Mikes, 274 F.2d at 697.
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they have not defined what counts as “goods or services.” Thus in Shaw v.
AAA Engineering and Drafting, the United States argued that the failure to
disclose illegal dumping of chemicals used in photographic developing vio-
lated the FCA because the defendant “was being paid not only for photogra-
phy services but also for environmental compliance.”183 There is a plausible
argument that the Government pays for every contract term that imposes a
duty on the other side. From this perspective, any breach is a failure to pro-
vide the goods or services contracted for.
Despite the analytic similarity between factual and legal falsehoods,
courts generally find it easy to distinguish breaches of a government con-
tract’s primary purpose from other breaches. Were we to rewrite the doc-
trine from the ground up, we would do away with the distinction between
factual and legal falsehoods altogether. Because we want to point the way
forward from existing law, we will work in the language courts use.
B. Statutory Authority
The False Claims Act is a federal statute. Any evaluation of the implied
certification doctrine, whether for fraud in the inducement or for fraud by
post-formation noncompliance, should begin with the statute’s text, pur-
pose, and history.184 There is no question but that factually false claims—
payment requests for goods or services never provided—violate section
(1)(A)’s prohibition of “false or fraudulent claims.”185 It is equally clear that a
false express certification qualifies as a “false record or statement material to
a false or fraudulent claim” under section (1)(B).186 It is less obvious where in
the statute one finds the authority for the implied certification doctrines.
In fact, there is a fair argument that the statute as written leaves no room
for implied certification. The phrase “false or fraudulent claim” in section
(1)(A), according to this argument, is a term of art with a well-established
meaning. A false or fraudulent claim is a request for payment for goods or
services that have not been provided.187 Section (1)(B) stipulates that a con-
tractor who does not make a false or fraudulent claim in this narrow sense
might still violate the FCA by submitting a “false record or statement” that
is material to the Government’s decision to pay.188 Because section (1)(B)
unequivocally requires an express certification—a “record or statement”—it
is difficult to make out an argument that it authorizes FCA claims based on
183. 213 F.3d 519, 531 (10th Cir. 2000).
184. YULE KIM, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 97-589, STATUTORY INTERPRETATION: GENERAL PRIN-
CIPLES AND RECENT TRENDS 2–3 (2008).
185. These were the very type of actions that the False Claims Act was enacted to address.
CONG. GLOBE, 36TH CONG., 3d SESS. 952 (1863).
186. United States ex rel. Hutcheson v. Blackstone Med., Inc., No. 10-1505, 2011 WL
2150191, at *4 (1st Cir. June 1, 2011); Conner, 543 F.3d at 1217;Mikes, 274 F.3d at 696–97.
187. But see Harrison v. Westinghouse Savannah River Co., 176 F.3d 776, 785–86 (4th Cir.
1999) (observing that “false or fraudulent claim” is a term of art with a broad, not a narrow,
meaning).
188. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(B) (Supp. III 2009).
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implied certification.189 Consequently, courts that address the statutory
authority for implied certification typically turn to section (1)(A).190 It is,
after all, the claim itself that is said to represent compliance or no fraud in
the inducement.191 But this broad reading of “false or fraudulent claim” in
section (1)(A) threatens to render section (1)(B) superfluous. If all claims
against the Government implicitly represent that the claiming party is not in
material breach or in violation of pertinent statutes and regulations or did
not commit fraud in the inducement, then it does not matter if the claim is
accompanied by an express certification to that effect. If Congress meant
section (1)(A) to include implied certification, why did it add section (1)(B)?
There are ways to avoid this conclusion. First, section (1)(A) uses the
term “false or fraudulent claim.”192 If the highlighted words do any work, one
might argue, it is to expand liability beyond claims that are merely false—
claims for goods or services not provided—to include claims tainted by
other sorts of fraudulent behavior.193 This does not yet tell us what sorts of
bad behavior suffice to render a claim fraudulent. If “fraudulent” has its
common law meaning, for example, it includes fraud in the inducement, but
perhaps excludes implied certification of post-formation compliance.194 The
189. In Pickens v. Kanawha River Towing, the district court reached a similar conclusion about
the so-called reverse false claim section, 916 F. Supp. 702, 708 (S.D. Ohio 1996), then codified
as section 3729(a)(7), which at that time defined FCA violations to include “knowingly mak-
[ing], us[ing], or caus[ing] to be made or used, a false record or statement to conceal, avoid, or
decrease an obligation to pay or transmit money or property to the Government,”31 U.S.C.
§ 3729(a)(7) (1994). After finding that the relator could use the implied certification theory
under section 3729(a)(1), the court concluded that the theory did not apply under section 3729
(a)(7), for the reason that “[a] failure to report does not count as a statement or record.”Pickens,
916 F. Supp. at 708. The 2009 amendments to the FCA changed the reverse false claims section
by adding knowing concealment to the list of wrongs, superceding Pickens. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)
(1)(G) (Supp. III 2009).
190. As the Tenth Circuit put it, because section (1)(A) “requires only the presentation of a
‘false or fraudulent claim for payment or approval’ without the additional element of a ‘false rec-
ord or statement,’ … FCA liability under [section (1)(A)] may arise even absent an affirmative or
express false statement by the government contractor.” Shaw v. AAA Eng’g & Drafting, Inc.,
213 F.3d 519, 531–32 (10th Cir. 2000). See also United States ex rel. Wright v. Cleo Wallace
Ctrs., 132 F. Supp. 2d 913, 925–26 (D. Colo. 2000); S.F. Unified Sch. Dist. ex rel. Contreras v.
Laidlaw Transit, Inc., 106 Cal. Rptr. 3d 84, 94 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010) (making similar argument
with respect to the interpretation of the California FCA).
Some courts have located authority for implied certification claims in section (1)(B), most
notably the Seventh Circuit in a fraud-in-the-inducement case. United States ex rel. Main v.
Oakland City Univ., 426 F.3d 914, 916 (7th Cir. 2005). This reading works especially well in
cases, like Main, in which the fraud in the inducement takes the form of an expressly false state-
ment. It does not work so well in cases of collusive bidding or other forms of fraud in the
inducement that do not turn on an express falsehood.
191. Mikes, 274 F.3d at 699 (“An implied false certification claim is based on the notion that
the act of submitting a claim for reimbursement itself implies compliance with governing federal
rules that are a precondition to payment.”).
192. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(A) (Supp. III 2009).
193. See United States ex rel. A+ Homecare, Inc. v. Medshares Mgmt. Grp., Inc., 400 F.3d
428, 443–44 (6th Cir. 2005) (on the authority of United States v. Wells, 519 U.S. 482, 490–92
(1997), using the common-law meaning of “fraudulent” to determine whether the FCA includes
a materiality requirement).
194. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 526 (1977).
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common law has long recognized fraud in the inducement but does not
interpret a request for payment as representing contractual compliance.195
Alternatively, one might seek a more expansive reading of “fraudulent” in
the flexibility that courts have traditionally adopted in defining “fraud.”
Courts commonly avoid narrow ex ante definitions of wrongful deception,
on the theory that such definitions tend to create safe harbors for bad actors
to exploit.196 So long as courts enforce robust scienter and materiality re-
quirements, “fraudulent” might reasonably be read to include the failure to
disclose a contractual, regulatory, or statutory violation.
Does the expansive reading of section (1)(A) as encompassing implied cer-
tification render section (1)(B) redundant? It might under the broad Ab-Tech
rule, according to which a claim implicitly represents no material breach or
violation.197 Such an implication would render express certification of mate-
rial compliance superfluous, but not under the Mikes compliance-condition
rule.198 According toMikes, a claim implies compliance only with those con-
tract terms, statutes, and regulations that expressly stipulate preconditions of
payment.199 A section (1)(B) express certification is subject to no such
requirement. It is enough that the defendant provided a “false record or
statement” material to the Government’s decision to pay.200 Thus, as the
district court in Ex rel. Hockett v. Columbia/HCA Healthcare explained, where
the “law does not specifically condition payment on compliance … to render
claims false, there typically is an express certification of compliance with
applicable law, not an implied representation.”201 Hockett concerned Medi-
care pricing regulations, compliance with which was not a condition of pay-
ment.202 Applying the above rule, the court concluded that annual express
certifications of compliance with those regulations might violate the FCA if
false, but that individual claims for payment did not implicitly certify com-
pliance and therefore could not be used in the calculation of per-claim
fines.203 So long as allegations of implied certification under section (1)(A)
are subject to elements that do not apply to claims of express certification
under (1)(B), implied certification does not render section (1)(B) redundant.
While the Supreme Court has yet to consider an implied certification
case, the Court’s interpretive approach to the False Claims Act supports an
195. See id. § 525 & cmt. B. The rule in many jurisdictions, described in Part II.B above, that
a breach alone will not support a claim for fraud suggests that a mere request for payment does
not imply compliance.
196. See, e.g., Smith v. Harrison, 49 Tenn. 230, 242–43 (1871) (“[I]t is part of the equity doc-
trine of fraud not to define it, lest the craft of men should find ways of committing fraud which
might evade such a definition.”).
197. Ab-Tech Constr., Inc. v. United States, 31 Fed. Cl. 429, 434–35 (1994).
198. Mikes v. Straus, 274 F.3d 687, 700 (2d Cir. 2001).
199. Id.
200. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(B) (Supp. III 2009).
201. United States ex rel. Hockett v. Columbia/HCA Healthcare, 498 F. Supp. 2d 25, 70
(D.D.C. 2007) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
202. Id.
203. Id. at 70–71.
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expansive reading of section (1)(A).204 The Court “has consistently refused
to accept a rigid, restrictive reading, even at the time when the statute im-
posed criminal sanctions as well as civil.”205 And it has held that the FCA is
“intended to reach all types of fraud, without qualification, that might result
in financial loss to the Government.”206 Lower courts have adopted similarly
expansive interpretive approaches to the Act.207 And the implied certification
theory finds some support in the Act’s legislative history. The House Report
on the 1986 amendments observed that “the False Claims Act is … used as
the primary vehicle by the Government for recouping losses suffered
through fraud.”208 And the Senate Report described the FCA as reaching
“each and every claim submitted under a contract … which was originally
obtained by means of false statements or other corrupt or fraudulent con-
duct, or in violation of any statute or applicable regulation.”209
Our interest in the implied certification rule is not so much in its statutory
pedigree as in its function and justification in the government contracting
process. The above interpretive arguments show that the language, purpose,
and history of the statute leave room for the judicially created implied certi-
fication rules. Those arguments do not preclude more narrow readings of
the statute. Nor do they show that implied certification is a good rule, or, if
so, which judicial approach to it is the right one. The correctness of implied
certification under the False Claims Act ultimately depends on the answers
to questions of policy and purpose.
C. Problems with the Certification-Condition Rule
The next Part argues that the policies and purposes of the False Claims
Act support implied certification of both no fraud in the inducement and
post-formation compliance with contract terms, statutes, and regulations.
More specifically, we argue that with respect to implied certification of post-
formation compliance, courts should adopt a variation on the compliance-
204. That said, the Court’s recent cases have tended to restrict the reach of the FCA. See
Schindler Elevator Corp. v. United States ex rel. Kirk, 131 S. Ct. 1885, 1893 (2011) (holding
that an agency’s written response to a Freedom of Information Act request constituted a public
disclosure, barring a qui tam action); Allison Engine Co. v. United States ex rel. Sanders, 128
S. Ct. 2123, 2130 (2008) (“Recognizing a cause of action under the FCA for fraud directed at
private entities would threaten to transform the FCA into an all-purpose antifraud statute.”);
Rockwell Int’l Corp. v. United States, 549 U.S. 457, 476 (2007) (refusing to allow a relator with
no “direct and independent knowledge of the information upon which his allegations were
based” to share in the recovery); Vt. Agency of Natural Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529
U.S. 765, 782–87 (2000) (refusing to construe the FCA to allow suits against states).
205. United States v. Neifert-White Co., 390 U.S. 228, 232 (1968).
206. Id.; see also Rainwater v. United States, 356 U.S. 590, 592 (1958) (“It seems quite clear
that the objective of Congress was broadly to protect the funds and property of the Government
from fraudulent claims.”).
207. See, e.g., Harrison v. Westinghouse Savannah River Co., 176 F.3d 776, 787–88 (4th Cir.
1999).
208. H.R. REP. NO. 99-660, at 18 (1986).
209. S. REP. NO. 99-345, at 9 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 5274.
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condition rule articulated by the Second Circuit in Mikes.210 There is much
less sense, however, to the certification-condition rule, which courts often
run together with the compliance-condition rule. The compliance-condition
rule holds that a claim for payment represents compliance only with those
terms, statutes, or regulations that condition payment or participation on
compliance with them.211 The certification-condition rule is that “a false certifi-
cation of compliance with a statute or regulation cannot serve as the basis for
a qui tam action under the FCA unless payment is conditioned on that certifi-
cation.”212 While many courts have articulated the certification-condition
rule,213 the cases exhibit considerable confusion as to its proper application
and one finds in them no clear justification for it. We suggest that courts
abandon the rule.
Judicial statements of the certification-condition rule leave it uncertain
whether it is meant to apply to allegations of express false certifications, of
implied false certifications, or both. There is an ordinary-language argument
that the rule should apply only to allegations of express false certification.214
Conditions precedent are events that might or might not occur, and are
often acts that are within a contractor’s control.215 The implicit meaning of
a claim is neither. This suggests that if a government contract conditions
payment on certification, it conditions payment on express certification.
But why should we insist that payment be conditioned on certification
when the defendant has made an express false certification—when it has
knowingly submitted “a false record or statement material to a false or fraud-
ulent claim” that otherwise satisfies section (1)(B)? In Pickens v. Kanawha
River Towing, an Ohio district court held that the defendant’s failure to re-
cord violations of the Clean Water Act in a ship’s log created a false record
for the purposes of the False Claims Act.216 In reaching this conclusion, the
court held that a ship’s log was “clearly a record” for purposes of the FCA,
that the FCA “does not require that the false record be one that the defen-
dant is under an obligation by law to maintain,” and that “if the government
relies upon or otherwise reviews such logs as part of its regulatory role, then
the Defendants would have submitted a false report in order to avoid an
obligation to the government.”217 We see little to criticize here. Given
210. Mikes v. Straus, 274 F.3d 687, 700 (2d Cir. 2001).
211. Id.
212. United States ex rel. Siewick v. Jamieson Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 214 F.3d 1372, 1376 (D.C.
Cir. 2000) (emphasis added).
213. See supra note 158.
214. See United States ex rel. Thompson v. Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp., 125 F.3d 899,
902–03 (5th Cir. 1997) (applying the certification-condition rule to Medicare annual cost
reports).
215. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 242 (1981).
216. 916 F. Supp. 702, 705–08 (S.D. Ohio 1996).
217. Id. at 708. Pickens dealt with a reverse FCA action under section 3739(a)(7), now codified
as section 3729(a)(1)(G). In United States ex rel. Bryant v. Williams Building Corp., 158 F. Supp.
2d 1001 (D.S.D. 2001), the district court reached a similar conclusion in a section (1)(B) case.
The defendant in Bryant allegedly failed to disclose in daily, nonmandatory progress reports the
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section (1)(B)’s requirement that the false record be both knowing and mate-
rial to the claim for payment, there is no reason to impose the additional re-
quirement that the certification be a condition of payment.
Some courts have applied the certification-condition rule instead to
allegations of implied certification of compliance. In Ex rel. Siewick v. Jamie-
son Science and Engineering, for example, the D.C. Circuit considered the
argument that a defense contractor implicitly certified compliance with a
revolving-door statute.218 The court affirmed summary judgment for the
defendant based on the fact that the plaintiff “point[ed] to nothing suggest-
ing that [the defendant] was required to certify compliance with § 207 as a
condition of its contract.”219 But the Siewick court did not explain why the
certification-condition rule should apply to allegations of implied certifica-
tion. The only proposed explanation we have found is in Ex rel. Hutcheson v.
Blackstone Medical, where the Massachusetts District Court distinguished
three versions of the implied certification theory:
[1] that a claim is legally false under an implied certification theory where a claim-
ant makes no express statement about compliance with a statute or regulation, but
by submitting a claim for payment [the claimant] implies that it has complied with
any preconditions to payment … [2] that the implied certification theory is essen-
tially a materiality analysis … [3] that implied certification exists where a statute
requires express certification but the claimant did not expressly certify.220
On the court’s third theory, the certification-condition rule is an interpretive
one: the fact that the payment is conditioned on certification explains why the
claim for payment implies compliance.221 But then the Hutcheson court was
surely right that this theory is “not broad enough to fully define” implied cer-
tification.222 That payment is conditioned on certification can be one possible
reason to interpret a claim for payment as implicitly certifying compliance. It
is not the only possible reason. The certification-condition rule is unsatisfac-
tory both as applied to allegations of express certification and as applied to
allegations of implied certification. Courts should abandon it.
discovery of asbestos in government housing units on which it was doing construction. Id. at
1003–04. Without expressly considering the mandatory/nonmandatory issue, the court held
that the plaintiff had submitted sufficient evidence that daily progress reports were expressly
false certifications under the FCA to survive the defendant’s motion for summary judgment. Id.
at 1009.
218. United States ex rel. Siewick v. Jamieson Sci. & Eng’g, 214 F.3d 1372, 1374 (D.C. Cir.
2000) (considering alleged violations of 18 U.S.C. § 207).
219. Id. at 1376; see also Harrison v. Westinghouse Savannah River Co., 176 F.3d 776, 793
(4th Cir. 1999) (affirming the dismissal of action based on implied certification “because [the
relator] has never asserted that such implied certifications were in any way related to, let alone
prerequisites for, receiving continued funding”); United States ex rel. Smith v. Yale Univ., 415
F. Supp. 2d 58, 91 (D. Conn. 2006) (applying the Mikes rule and finding that certification was a
prerequisite); United States ex rel. Graves v. ITT Educ. Servs., Inc., 284 F. Supp. 2d 487, 497
(S.D. Tex. 2003) (applying the certification-condition rule to implied certification).
220. United States ex rel. Hutcheson v. Blackstone Med., Inc., 694 F. Supp. 2d 48, 62–63
(D. Mass. 2010), rev’d, 2011 WL 2150191 (1st Cir. June 1, 2011).
221. Id. at 63.
222. Id.
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IV. A THEORY OF IMPLIED CERTIFICATION
Part II of this Article provided a theory of the False Claims Act as a
whole. The theory begins from the fact that it is often especially difficult for
the Government to detect breaches of contract or material violations of sta-
tutes or regulations by government contractors.223 The FCA addresses this
problem by allowing the Government to contract for effective duties to
cooperate, in the form of certifications of compliance backed by extracom-
pensatory remedies.224 We are now in a position to apply that theory to eval-
uate the judicially created doctrines of implied certification. There are two
types of implied certification cases: those in which the alleged underlying
and nondisclosed wrong is fraud in the inducement and those in which the
alleged underlying and nondisclosed wrong is post-formation noncompli-
ance with a contract term, statute, or regulation. This Article’s primary
interest is implied certification of the second type. But it will be useful to
start with a few words about the first.
A. Implied Certification of No Fraud in the Inducement
Judge Easterbrook has suggested that fraud in the inducement belongs
under the FCA umbrella because fraud is fraud, no matter when it occurs.225
In Ex rel. Main v. Oakland City University he stated that
[t]he statute requires a causal rather than a temporal connection between fraud
and payment. If a false statement is integral to a causal chain leading to payment it
is irrelevant how the federal bureaucracy has apportioned the statements among
layers of paperwork.226
While we like Judge Easterbrook’s realist approach, his proposed explana-
tion ignores entrenched differences between the common law’s treatment of
fraud in the inducement and its treatment of fraud in the performance. As we
discussed in Part II.B, U.S. courts tend to disfavor claims of post-formation
fraud in the performance. The FCA rules for factually false claims, false
express certification, and even false implied certification of compliance
address that disfavor. The statute mandates treble damages and fines where
courts might otherwise limit a plaintiff to contract remedies.227
The common law places no similar hurdles before the plaintiff who al-
leges fraud in the inducement.228 There is no question but that a contractor
who secures a government contract by deliberate deception has committed
the tort of fraud, giving the Government the right to both compensatory
223. See supra notes 89–100 and accompanying text.
224. See 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1) (Supp. III 2009).
225. United States ex rel. Main v. Oakland City Univ., 426 F.3d 914, 916 (7th Cir. 2005).
226. Id. (internal citations omitted).
227. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1) (Supp. III 2009).
228. See supra notes 194–95 and accompanying text.
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and punitive damages.229 Like the FCA, the common law’s remedial scheme
is designed both to make the Government whole and to punish those who
have defrauded it.230 Moreover, unlike fraud in the performance, fraud in
the inducement gives the Government the right to cancel the contract,231
providing an additional deterrent against pre-formation fraud.232 And the
false statement statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1001, criminalizes false statements to
and other forms of fraud against the Government.233 While it is often un-
clear whether an implied certification of post-formation compliance would
constitute a lie for purposes of such criminal liability, fraud in the induce-
ment often involves express falsehoods that clearly do. Taken together, these
laws provide the Federal Government considerable protection against fraud
in the inducement—considerably more than against fraud in the perfor-
mance, despite Judge Easterbrook’s equation of the two.234
The puzzle, then, is this: Given that the common law and criminal sta-
tutes already protect the Government against fraud in the inducement, and
that the language of the False Claims Act applies only to fraud in the perfor-
mance, why should courts go out of their way to read the Act to cover pre-
formation fraud? The Supreme Court’s explanation of an enduring taint235
is no more than a metaphor. Judge Easterbrook’s leveling approach ignores
the legal difference between fraud in the inducement and fraud in the perfor-
mance. So why not adhere more closely to the FCA text?
One possible answer is that, in many cases, the Government can recover
more under the False Claims Act than it can under federal common law.
Compensatory damages for the tort of fraud are limited to the Government’s
verifiable losses236 and awards of punitive damages are available only at the
discretion of juries and trial judges.237 The FCA, on the contrary, requires
229. United States v. United Techs. Corp., 626 F.3d 313, 321–25 (6th Cir. 2010); United
States ex rel. Westrick v. Second Chance Body Armor Inc., 685 F. Supp. 2d 129, 136–42 (D.D.C.
2010).
230. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 549, 906–08 (1977).
231. United States ex rel. Garrison v. Crown Roofing Servs., Inc., No. H-07-1018, 2011 WL
1005062, at *5 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 16, 2011); United States v. A & C Invs., Inc., 513 F. Supp. 589,
590 (N.D. Ill. 1981); Brown v. United States, 524 F.2d 693, 700 (Ct. Cl. 1975).
232. For a theory of the deterrent effect of the right to terminate, see Richard Craswell, Prop-
erty Rules and Liability Rules in Unconscionability and Related Doctrines, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 7–8
(1993).
233. 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a) (2006). See, e.g., Rockwell Int’l Corp. v. United States, 549 U.S.
457, 462–63 (2007); United States ex rel. Crews v. NCS Healthcare of Ill., Inc., 460 F.3d 853,
858 (7th Cir. 2006); United States v. Eghbal, 475 F. Supp. 2d 1008, 1011 (C.D. Cal. 2007);
United States ex rel. V.I. Hous. Auth. v. Coastal Gen. Constr. Servs. Corp., 299 F. Supp. 2d
483, 485 (D.V.I. 2004); United States ex rel. Rosales v. S.F. Hous. Auth., 173 F. Supp. 2d 987,
1001 (N.D. Cal. 2001).
234. United States ex rel. Main v. Oakland City Univ., 426 F.3d 914, 916 (7th Cir. 2005).
235. United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537, 543 (1943).
236. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 549(2) (1977) (stating that a plaintiff is entitled to
“damages sufficient to give him the benefit of his contract … if these damages are proved with
reasonable certainty”).
237. United States ex rel. Rosales v. S.F. Hous. Auth., 173 F. Supp. 2d 987, 1024 (N.D. Cal.
2001).
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courts to award treble damages and, in most cases, per-claim fines of
between $5,000 and $10,000.238 Add the provisions for recovery of the costs
of bringing the action,239 and the amounts involved can far exceed what
would be available in a common law action for fraud.
But these higher damage amounts are icing on the cake. If courts had not
read the FCA to cover fraud in the inducement, they might instead have de-
veloped federal common law to achieve the same results. Courts could have
held, for example, that punitive damages are especially warranted for fraud
against the Government, as such deception is both especially wrongful and
especially likely to go undetected. Nor should we forget the deterrence effect
of criminalization.240 It is not obvious that the FCA’s higher damage mea-
sures are needed.
More significant are the FCA’s qui tam provisions.241 As we argued in
Part II.B, fraud against the Government is especially likely to go undetected.
Government employees and organizations tasked with monitoring for fraud
often do a poor job of it.242 And the structure of many government contracts
makes fraud especially difficult to detect.243 Permitting private persons to
sue on behalf of the Government addresses the detection problem. By ex-
tending the FCA to cover fraud in the inducement, courts give those with
knowledge of such fraud a new reason to share that information with the
Government. While the FCA’s remedial scheme adds some deterrence, it is
the Act’s qui tam provisions that provide the real punch.244
238. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1) (Supp. III 2009).
239. Id. § 3729(a)(3).
240. See Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. W.R. Grace & Co., 877 F.2d 614, 623 (7th Cir. 1989).
241. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)(1) (2006).
242. See supra note 89.
243. See supra notes 92–94 and accompanying text.
244. Our observations about the redundancy of FCA liability for fraud in the inducement and
the explanation in the Act’s qui tam provisions find some support in the legislative history. In
1863, Representative Cowan argued that that the FCA was unnecessary because existing laws
already outlawed fraudulent misrepresentation.
I believe now in addition to the remedies provided by the common law, there is a statute in
almost every State in the Union which makes the procurement of money or any valuable
thing by means of a false misrepresentation of an existing fact, and by means of the credence
which he obtains in consequence of that false misrepresentation, procures money or any other
valuable thing, that instant he becomes guilty of the offense and is within the range and pur-
view, I think, of the statute of every State in the Union, and I am not so certain but also within
the laws and statutes of the United States.
CONG. GLOBE, 36TH CONG., 3D SESS. 952, 954–55 (1863) (statement of Rep. Cowan). He argued
that the problem facing the Government was that its agents were routinely failing to bring suit
based on fraudulent misrepresentations:
Indeed, it is not now so much for the want of law that this mischief prevails everywhere, as it
is from a seeming utter unwillingness on the part of those in authority to vindicate the laws
that already exist by subjecting to punishment those who are guilty.… Are there no courts;
are there no district attorneys; is the form of indictment lost; or is it taken to be understood
that a man can cheat the Government with impunity, although as to all other people he is
amenable to the municipal laws for preventing frauds and cheats? I have no doubt that if the
officers of the Government would do their duty when a man is caught procuring money by
these pretenses, and false and forged claims in any of the thousand modes by which it may be
Implied Certification Under the False Claims Act 35
We are not the first to argue that the False Claims Act’s qui tam provi-
sions address the difficulty of detecting fraud against the Government. Con-
gress emphasized the detection problem when it strengthened the FCA’s qui
tam provisions in 1986,245 and then again when it amended the Act in
2009.246 And many scholars have made similar observations.247 Our point,
however, is a bit different. The difficulty in detecting fraud against the Gov-
ernment explains not only why the FCA has its qui tam provisions, but also
why courts should choose to extend the FCA, with its qui tam provisions,
beyond post-formation falsehoods to include fraud in the inducement. Inter-
preting a claim for payment as certifying that the contract has not been ob-
tained by fraud expands the enforcement of already-existing rules against
fraud in the inducement. While the FCA’s remedies are redundant as applied
to fraud in the inducement, its procedural provisions are not.
B. Implied Certification of Compliance
The False Claims Act’s remedial provisions are not redundant when
applied to fraud in the performance, which the Act more clearly targets. Fac-
tually false claims for payment (section (A)(1)) and false express certifications
of post-formation compliance (section (A)(2)) are both forms of fraud in the
performance. So too are the false implied certifications of post-formation
compliance that some courts have found. The law does not give contracting
parties nearly as much protection against fraud in the performance as it gives
them against fraud in the inducement.248 That difference, together with the
theory of contractual duties to cooperate, explains and justifies the FCA’s
special attention to the former.
done, he could be punished. He could be now if the proper officers were on his trail, and if
the proper precautions were taken to enforce the laws we now have.
Id. at 954.
245. See S. REP. NO. 99-345, at 4 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 5269 (“De-
tecting fraud is usually very difficult without the cooperation of individuals who are either close
observers or otherwise involved in the fraudulent activity. Yet in the area of Government fraud
there appears to be a great unwillingness to expose illegalities.”).
246. See The False Claims Act Correction Act (S. 2041): Strengthening the Government’s Most
Effective Tool Against Fraud for the 21st Century: Hearing on S. 2041 Before the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 110th Cong. 120 (2008) (Statement of Pamela Bucy, Bambridge Professor of Law,
Univ. of Ala. Sch. of Law) (“Complex economic wrongdoing cannot be detected or deterred
effectively without the help of those who are intimately familiar with it. Law enforcement will
always be outsiders to organizations where fraud is occurring. They will not find out about such
fraud until it is too late, if at all. When law enforcement does find out about such fraud, it is
very labor intensive to investigate.”).
247. See, e.g., Kovacic, supra note 76, at 1822–24; Joel M. Androphy & Mark A. Correro,
Whistleblower and Federal Qui Tam Litigation—Suing the Corporation for Fraud, 45 S. TEX. L. REV.
23, 26 (2003); J. Randy Beck, The False Claims Act and the English Eradication of Qui Tam Legisla-
tion, 78 N.C. L. REV. 539, 554–63 (2000); Carl Pacini & Michael Bret Hood, The Role of Qui
Tam Actions Under the False Claims Act in Preventing and Deterring Fraud Against the Government,
15 U. MIAMI BUS. L. REV. 273, 276–77 (2007).
248. See supra Part II.B.
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Yet, on the whole, courts have been less sympathetic to claims of implied
certification of post-formation compliance than to claims of implied certifi-
cation of no fraud in the inducement. This attitude is of a piece with the gen-
eral judicial reluctance to impose tort liability for fraud in the performance,
and perhaps reflects courts’ sense that tort principles should not be allowed
to intrude into contractual relationships.249 But it also stems from worries
specific to the False Claims Act context, such as the threat of interference
with other regulatory mechanisms and the costs of frivolous litigation.250
We believe that despite these costs, there are good reasons to sometimes
impose FCA liability for what is, in effect, a government contractor’s failure
to disclose breach. Sorting out just when this is the case is the project of the
remainder of this Part.251 This section develops a theoretical framework that
can be used to evaluate implied certification. To develop the theory, we tem-
porarily restrict ourselves to Ab-Tech’s simple, if relatively broad, implied
certification rule: “a contractor who knowingly fails to perform a material
requirement of its contract, … yet seeks or receives payment as if it fully per-
formed without disclosing the nonperformance, has presented a false claim
to the Government and may be liable therefor.”252 The next section applies
the framework to examine how and why we might want to narrow, or even
abandon, the Ab-Tech rule.
The Ab-Tech rule involves two interpretive defaults. First, and most ob-
viously, the rule provides that, unless a government contractor says other-
wise, its claim for payment implicitly represents compliance with all material
terms of the contract.253 We consider this an interpretive default because we
think a contractor could avoid FCA liability by expressly informing the Gov-
ernment of any material breach or violation when requesting payment, and
perhaps even by expressly disclaiming any implied representation of compli-
ance. Second, and less obviously, the default meaning of a claim can itself be
a matter of contract. We believe that it should be possible for the parties to a
government contract to stipulate whether a claim shall or shall not represent
material compliance. If this is right, then Ab-Tech also establishes a contrac-
tual default: if the contract is silent, claims for payment represent compli-
ance. The first default governs the interpretation of claims, the second
249. See WILLIAM LLOYD PROSSER, The Borderland of Tort and Contract, in SELECTED TOPICS
ON THE LAW OF TORTS 380, 437–38 (1954).
250. See infra notes 283–90 and accompanying text.
251. The theory of implied certification that we develop in this section could be extended to
explain FCA liability for factually false claims under section (1)(A) as well. As we noted in Part
II.B, factually false claims straddle the divide between express and implied falsehoods. A claim
for payment need not expressly list goods or services provided to support a claim under section
(1)(A). Nor need it expressly state that those goods or services have value, though if they are
worthless the claim might be found factually false. A full-blown theory of the rule for factual
falsehoods also would explain these aspects of the rule. That explanation would be similar to the
account of the rules for implied legal falsehoods that we develop here.
252. United States ex rel. Accudyne Corp., 921 F. Supp. 611, 627 (W.D. Wis. 1995) (sum-
marizing the Ab-Tech rule).
253. Ab-Tech Constr., Inc. v. United States, 31 Fed. Cl. 429, 434 (1994).
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default the interpretation of contracts. Whether courts should adopt these
interpretive defaults depends on a variety of familiar factors, which Ian Ayres
and Robert Gertner have cataloged.254 We begin with Ab-Tech’s default
interpretation of claims for payment.
The Ab-Tech claim default has three important advantages. First, it is
hopefully majoritarian. If most government contractors perform their obli-
gations, then unless there is a significant worry about enforcement error
(which we consider below), most would prefer to represent compliance.
Second, an implied representation of compliance is also the information-
forcing default. Contractors who are in contractual, statutory, and regulatory
compliance already have a reason to share that information; noncompliant con-
tractors do not. The implied representation gives the latter group a new reason
to expressly disclose material breaches or violations.
Third, the implied representation tracks the ethical standards to which gov-
ernment contractors should be held. Oliver Wendell Holmes observed that
“[m]en must turn square corners when they deal with the Government.”255
We think this is as much an ethical truth as a legal one. The special obliga-
tions of those who contract with the Government are a large, and largely un-
explored, topic. It is no mistake that the False Claims Act was first passed dur-
ing the Civil War.256 The ethical or civic duties of government contractors
are especially vivid in defense-related contracts during times of war. In the
words of an 1863 House report: “Worse than traitors in arms are the men,
who pretend loyalty to the flag, feast and fatten on the misfortunes of the
nation, while patriot blood is crimsoning the plains of the south, and bodies of
their countrymen moldering the dust.”257 Shirking and deception in such con-
tracts entail more than reductions in or reallocations of gains of trade. A crate
labeled muskets and filled with sawdust exploits collective efforts at self-
defense for individual gain and puts at risk individuals who are serving the col-
lective good. All government contracts exhibit something of this structure. It
is the citizenry as a whole that ultimately pays the price of opportunism
against the Government. Perhaps in private contracting the rules of the game
permit such purely self-regarding acts—though even here there are reasons
for doubt.258 But the ethical norms governing those who contract with the
polity as a whole demand more. Requesting payment on a government con-
tract that one has knowingly materially breached is simply wrong. The com-
pliance default expresses and institutionalizes that ethical fact.
254. See Ayres & Gertner, Filling Gaps, supra note 19, at 95–127.
255. Rock Island C.R.R. v. United States, 254 U.S. 141, 143 (1920).
256. False Claims Act, ch. 67, 12 Stat. 696 (1863).
257. REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS, H.R. REP. NO. 37-50, at 47
(1863). This statement is often mistakenly attributed to Abraham Lincoln. See, e.g., 89 CONG.
REC. 10847 (1943); David Heron et al., Bad Mules: A Primer on the Federal and Michigan False
Claims Acts, MICH. B.J., Nov. 2009, at 22, 22.
258. See, e.g., Market St. Assocs. Ltd. P’ship v. Frey, 941 F.2d 588, 593–94 (7th Cir. 1991);
Todd D. Rakoff, Good Faith in Contract Performance: Market Street Associates Ltd. Partnership
v. Frey, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1187, 1190–91 (2007).
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Cutting against the Ab-Tech claim rule is the stickiness of a default repre-
sentation of compliance. Defaults are sticky when parties who would or
should prefer to say something other than the default fail to opt out of it.259
One cost of opting out of the Ab-Tech compliance default is the cost of
knowing when one is in breach. Only contractors who are aware of a breach
or violation know to opt out of the implicit certification of compliance.
The FCA’s separate scienter requirement,260 however, minimizes that cost.
A contractor who misrepresents compliance because it is even negligently
ignorant of its own breach or violation should escape FCA liability. More
significant is the fact that the compliance default runs against the grain of
the common law. The general law of contracts does not interpret a claim for
payment as representing material compliance.261 Unsophisticated govern-
ment contractors are therefore less likely to know what they are saying by
asking for payment. Finally, and most obviously, we can expect the default to
stick because contractors who are in breach will not want to share that fact.
It is the stickiness of the Ab-Tech default that explains the familiar objec-
tion that the Ab-Tech rule threatens to transform every breach of a govern-
ment contract, statute, or regulation into an FCA suit.262 A sticky default
can be a good thing. For example, if the representation of material compli-
ance tracks the right ethical standards for government contractors, then it is
not a problem that contractors who would prefer not to make the represen-
tation do not opt out of it. But stickiness also has its downsides. We see four
possible worries: interference with efficient breach, increased costs of judi-
cial error, lowering the bar for frivolous litigation, and interference with
administrative regulatory mechanisms. We find only the last two significant.
Those schooled in the theory of efficient breach might worry that in-
creased FCA liability threatens to undermine the expectation measure of da-
mages. Supercompensatory awards such as the FCA’s treble damages and
per-claim fines, the objection goes, will tend to discourage efficient breaches,
and the Government will ultimately pay for that efficiency loss.263 A contrac-
tor that knows that, if its costs of performance go up or if a better opportu-
nity appears, it will not have the option of breaching and paying damages
will charge the Government a higher price for its goods or services. That
higher price will not correspond to a better product, but will reflect the
259. Ayres & Gertner,Majoritarian vs. Minoritarian Defaults, supra note 19, at 1598.
260. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(b)(1) (Supp. III 2009).
261. See infra notes 194–95 and accompanying text.
262. See United States ex rel. Conner v. Salina Reg’l Health Ctr., Inc., 543 F.3d 1211, 1221
(10th Cir. 2008) (finding “no basis in either law or logic to adopt an express false certification
theory that turns every violation of a Medicare regulation into the subject of an FCA qui tam
suit”); Mikes v. Straus, 274 F.3d 687, 697 (2d Cir. 2001) (“[A] claim for reimbursement made to
the government is not legally false simply because the particular service furnished failed to com-
ply with the mandates of a statute, regulation or contractual term that is only tangential to the
service for which reimbursement is sought.”).
263. For an economic account of why this is so, see Richard Craswell, Passing on the Costs of
Legal Rules: Efficiency & Distribution in Buyer-Seller Relationships, 43 STAN. L. REV. 361 (1991).
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reduced value that the transaction is expected to generate. The costs to con-
tractors of expanded FCA liability will be passed on to the Government.264
This worry rests on two mistakes. First, it neglects the simplifying as-
sumptions of the efficient breach theory: that the nonbreaching party is
aware of the breach and that the transaction costs of awarding expectation
damages are less than it would cost the parties to negotiate a release.265 The
FCA comes into play only when these simplifying assumptions do not hold.
Under the implied certification rule, a contractor has violated the FCA only
if the Government paid a claim in ignorance of a material breach, and then
only because the contractor breached its duty to cooperate by failing to
inform the Government of its nonperformance.266 Without knowledge of
the breach, the Government will not sue for expectation damages. Far from
threatening efficient breach, the duties to cooperate that the FCA enforces
are designed to secure the conditions that make efficient breach possible.
Second, the efficient breach theory assumes that the only costs of a
breach are monetizable losses suffered by the nonbreaching party.267 As we
have already observed, government contracts often include material terms—
statutory or regulatory compliance, ownership requirements, adherence to
labor and hiring standards—that are not designed solely to increase the
value of the goods or services provided.268 Because the breach of such a term
does not impose a direct financial loss on the Government, it is difficult to
judge when that breach is efficient. More to the point, there is no guarantee
that the expectation measure will force the breaching party to internalize the
social costs of such violations, though those social costs are precisely the rea-
son the Government chose to include the term in the contract.269
There are, however, other reasons to worry about increased costs that
come from the stickiness of the Ab-Tech default. One is the risk of enforce-
ment error.270 Government contracts are complex creatures whose meaning
is often difficult for a court or jury to sort out after the fact. Absent the FCA,
an erroneous finding of breach exposes a government contractor to liability
for compensatory damages.271 With an expanded FCA, an erroneous finding
of breach exposes the contractor to treble damages and per-claim fines.272
Even if FCA liability is efficient in cases of actual breach and actual failure to
inform, contractors might reasonably worry about false positives. The costs
264. See id.
265. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 150–52 (8th ed. 2010).
266. See supra Part III.A.
267. See POSNER, supra note 265, at 149–54 (discussing cost of an efficient breach in terms of
actual economic loss).
268. See supra notes 92–93.
269. See generallyMCCRUDDEN, supra note 92.
270. See Kovacic, supra note 76, at 1831–32.
271. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 344 cmt. a (1981) (describing the goal of
damages for breach as attempting to compensate the nonbreaching party).
272. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1) (Supp. III 2009).
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of false positives will again be built into the prices charged the Government,
ultimately increasing the price the public pays for goods and services.
There is something to this second objection, though we think less than
first appears. Most importantly, the objection neglects the FCA’s scienter
requirement.273 Under the Ab-Tech rule, as in any FCA case, the plaintiff
must prove not only that the defendant was in material breach when it sub-
mitted the claim, but also that it knew of or was deliberately indifferent to
that breach.274 Courts have not shied away from applying the FCA’s scienter
requirements to protect contractors against liability for unknown breaches
or violations.275 These scienter requirements function to sort out borderline
instances of material breach—just those where judicial error is most likely.
Many hard cases turn not on what the defendant did, but on what the con-
tract, statutes, or regulations required her to do. Their outcomes depend on
questions of interpretation. Where the relevant term or rule is susceptible to
two or more readings, the defendant has a scienter defense close at hand: it
reasonably believed that it was not under the obligation in question. In Ex
rel. Lamers v. City of Green Bay, for example, the relator brought an FCA suit
on the basis of a municipality’s alleged noncompliance with bus-routing re-
quirements for federal transit grants.276 Emphasizing the complexity and
nuance of the regulations, the Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment
for the defendant.277 The court concluded that some of the alleged false cer-
tifications “reveal more confusion than artifice,” while others were at most
“fudging under the mistaken impression” that the city had to meet certain
requirements.278 The scienter requirement tends to insulate from FCA lia-
bility precisely those cases where false positives are most likely.
We find a third worry about Ab-Tech’s claim default more significant.
The Ab-Tech rule lowers the bar for alleging an FCA violation, imposing
added litigation costs on government contractors forced to reply to frivolous
claims. Like other allegations of fraud, FCA suits are subject to the heigh-
tened pleading requirements of Rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure.279 Absent the theory of implied certification, an FCA plaintiff must
273. Id. § 3729(b)(1).
274. Ab-Tech Constr. Co. v. United States, 31 Fed. Cl. 429, 434 (1994).
275. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Lamers v. City of Green Bay, 168 F.3d 1013, 1018–20 (7th
Cir. 1999); United States ex rel. Swafford v. Borgess Med. Ctr., 98 F. Supp. 2d 822, 832–33
(W.D. Mich. 2000); United States ex rel. Butler v. Hughes Helicopters, Inc., 71 F.3d 321, 328–
29 (9th Cir. 1995); United States ex rel. Roby v. Boeing Co., 100 F. Supp. 2d 619, 626 (S.D.
Ohio 2000); Riley Constr. Co. v. United States, 65 Fed. Cl. 264, 269–70 (2005); Wang v. FMC
Corp., 975 F.2d 1412, 1420–21 (9th Cir. 1992); United States v. Basin Elec. Power Coop., 248
F.3d 781, 792–94 (8th Cir. 2001); United States v. Newport News Shipbuilding, Inc., 276
F. Supp. 2d 539, 560–61, 565 (E.D. Va. 2003).
276. Lamers, 168 F.3d at 1014.
277. Id. at 1019–20.
278. Id. at 1019. For an example of an easy case where the court affirmed a finding of knowl-
edge or reckless indifference, see United States ex rel. Augustine v. Century Health Servs., 289
F.3d 409, 416 (6th Cir. 2002).
279. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Thompson v. Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp., 125 F.3d
899, 903 (5th Cir. 1997) (affirming dismissal of FCA claim not pled with sufficient particularity);
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plead with particularity either that the defendant submitted a claim for
goods or services not provided (section (1)(A)) or that the defendant sub-
mitted an express false certification of compliance (section (1)(B)). Under
the Ab-Tech rule, this is no longer the case. To survive a motion to dismiss,
the plaintiff need allege only that the defendant made a claim for payment
knowing that it was in material breach.280
The problem here lies in the Act’s qui tam provisions. Anyone who spends
a bit of time with the FCA case law will be struck by the proportion of FCA
actions that appear in employment disputes. This is not in itself a bad thing.
The FCA was designed to give employees with inside information about gov-
ernment fraud a new reason to share that information with enforcers.281 But
the Ab-Tech rule’s reduced pleading requirements make it much easier to
attach a colorable FCA claim to what is essentially a suit for wrongful dis-
charge or other employment-related action.282 Because the FCA claim is
more likely to survive a motion to dismiss, it will impose costs on the govern-
ment contractor and the court system whether or not it ultimately succeeds—
again increasing the costs of contracting with the Federal Government.
The last problem with the Ab-Tech rule is one emphasized both by the
Ninth Circuit in Hopper and by the Second Circuit in Mikes: the FCA is a
blunt instrument for the enforcement of statutory and regulatory compli-
ance, especially where there exist administrative and other mechanisms that
can provide more tailored or nuanced responses to the underlying wrongs.283
Ebeid ex rel. United States. v. Lungwitz, 616 F.3d 993, 998–99 (9th Cir. 2010) (same); United
States ex rel. Willard v. Humana Health Plan of Tex. Inc., 336 F.3d 375, 384–85 (5th Cir. 2003)
(same); Gublo v. NovaCare, Inc., 62 F. Supp. 2d 347, 354–55 (D. Mass. 1999) (same); United
States ex rel. Smith v. Yale Univ., 415 F. Supp. 2d 58, 82–89 (D. Conn. 2006) (same).
280. Compare United States ex rel. Lemmon v. Envirocare of Utah, Inc., 614 F.3d 1163 (10th
Cir. 2010) (reversing lower court’s dismissal of implied certification claim), and United States ex
rel. Pogue v. Am. Healthcorp, Inc., 914 F. Supp. 1507, 1509–13 (M.D. Tenn. 1996) (same), and
In re Cardiac Devices Qui Tam Litig., 221 F.R.D. 318, 346–47 (D. Conn. 2004) (denying
12(b)(6) motion because claim legally false, if not factually false), and United States ex rel.
Wright v. Cleo Wallace Ctrs., 132 F. Supp. 2d 913, 926 (D. Colo. 2000) (same), with United
States ex rel. Lobel v. Express Scripts, Inc., 351 F. App’x 778, 779–80 (3d Cir. 2009) (granting
12(b) motion because compliance with statute not condition of payment), and Willard, 336 F.3d
at 382–83 (same), and United States ex rel. Westmoreland v. Amgen, Inc., 707 F. Supp. 2d 123,
137–39 (D. Mass. 2010) (same).
281. See United States ex rel. Hopper v. Anton, 91 F.3d 1261, 1266 (9th Cir. 1996) (“The
archetypal qui tam FCA action is filed by an insider at a private company who discovers his
employer has overcharged under a government contract.”).
282. Or, in Medicare cases, a medical malpractice lawsuit. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Bai-
ley v. Ector Cnty. Hosp., 386 F. Supp. 2d 759 (W.D. Tex. 2004). In Bailey, the plaintiff argued
that pre-surgery tests were unnecessary, endangered his life, and “were performed only to obtain
money [from] Medicare.” Id. at 761. The court dismissed the plaintiff ’s FCA claim because he
failed to plead it with sufficient particularity. Id. at 764.
283. Mikes v. Straus, 274 F.3d 687, 699 (2d Cir. 2001); Hopper, 91 F.3d at 1267. See alsoMal-
colm Harkins, The Ubiquitous False Claims Act, 1 ST. LOUIS U. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 131, 134
(2007).
William E. Kovacic has argued that FCA actions can also interfere with nonlegal, relational
methods of resolving contractual disputes between contractors and contracting agencies. Supra
note 76, at 1834–38. We are not convinced by Kovacic’s argument. First, it neglects the fact
that a contractor can insulate itself from FCA liability by cooperating with the Government in
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Many courts have expressed this worry in Medicare cases. As a California
district court observed:
To allow FCA suits to proceed where government payment of Medicare claims is
not conditioned on perfect regulatory compliance—and where HHS may choose
to waive administrative remedies, or impose a less drastic sanction than full denial
of payment—would improperly permit qui tam plaintiffs to supplant the regula-
tory discretion granted to HHS under the Social Security Act, essentially turning
a discretionary denial of payment remedy into a mandatory penalty for failure to
meet Medicare requirements.284
Add to this the fact that many Medicare enforcement actions concern the
quality of care, in effect regulating the practice of medicine and potentially
encroaching on the jurisdictions of state and local regulatory bodies.285 Other
areas where courts have noted potential regulatory interference include com-
pliance with environmental regulations,286 educational standards,287 low-
income housing programs,288 and federal transportation regulations.289 Here
too the availability of the qui tam action exacerbates the problem. When the
federal government brings a suit under the FCA, it has presumably balanced
discovering and addressing breaches. See Ben Depoorter & Jeff De Mot, Whistle Blowing: An
Economic Analysis of the False Claims Act, 14 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 135, 154 (2006) (“Confessions
will be enhanced when a company can prevent the willful decision of private attorney generals
to prosecute if the novelty aspect of the information is preempted by the company itself.”). Sec-
ond, while Kovacic is probably right that “purchasing agencies and contractors sometimes col-
lectively ignore or bend procurement rules because full compliance would significantly inhibit
the efficient production of needed goods and services,”supra note 76, at 1837, we think the cure
is to build more flexibility into government contracts, rather than ignoring their breach. Third,
we think the more significant problem in government contracting is agency overidentification
with the interests of private contractors. While the recently disbanded Minerals Management
Service was perhaps an extreme example, the problems of agency capture and corruption are
widespread. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, OIG INVESTIGATIONS OF
MMS EMPLOYEES (Sept. 8, 2008), available at http://www.doioig.gov/images/stories/reports/
pdf//RIKinvestigation.pdf. The FCA tends to disrupt unduly close relationships between
agencies and private contractors, exerting a pressure on them to remain at arm’s length. In sum,
while we think agencies need flexibility in performing their regulatory functions, as parties to
contracts agencies do better turning the same square corners that their counterparts must.
284. United States ex rel. Swan v. Covenant Care, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 2d 1212, 1221 (E.D.
Cal. 2002). See also United States ex rel. Conner v. Salina Reg’l Health Ctr., Inc., 543 F.3d 1211,
1221 (10th Cir. 2008) (Under expansive FCA liability, “[a]n individual private litigant ostensibly
acting on behalf of the United States could prevent the government from proceeding deliber-
ately through the carefully crafted remedial process and could demand damages far in excess of
the entire value of Medicare services performed by a hospital.”); United States ex rel. Lamers v.
City of Green Bay, 168 F.3d 1013, 1020 (7th Cir. 1999) (“[The plaintiff], it seems, wants to use
the FCA to preempt the FTA’s discretionary decision not to pursue regulatory penalties against
the City. But the FCA is not an appropriate vehicle for policing technical compliance with
administrative regulations.”).
285. See Mikes, 274 F.3d at 700 (“[C]ourts are not the best forum to resolve medical issues
concerning levels of care. State, local or private medical agencies, boards and societies are better
suited to monitor quality of care issues.”).
286. See Pickens v. Kanawha River Towing, 916 F. Supp. 702, 705–06 (S.D. Ohio 1996).
287. United States ex rel. Diop v. Wayne Cnty. Cmty. Coll. Dist., 242 F. Supp. 2d 497, 525
(E.D. Mich. 2003).
288. United States v. Southland Mgmt. Corp., 326 F.3d 669, 675 (5th Cir. 2003).
289. Lamers, 168 F.3d at 1020.
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any costs of interference with other regulatory mechanisms against the bene-
fits of recovery under the Act. The qui tam plaintiff has little or no reason to
take such regulatory interference into account.290
For the moment we do not draw any conclusions about how these differ-
ent factors balance out when evaluating the desirability of Ab-Tech’s default
interpretation of a claim for payment. Our goal in this section is to provide a
general theory of implied certification. The next section applies that theory
to the doctrine. Before going there, however, we must address the second
side of the Ab-Tech default. The default interpretation of a claim for payment
as representing material compliance can itself be a creature of contract.
Absent the Ab-Tech rule, the parties might contract into that default. Under
the Ab-Tech rule, the parties might in theory contract out of it.291 The Ab-
Tech rule is, therefore, also a contractual default: it specifies the legal effects
of the parties’ acts absent their agreement to the contrary.292
The most significant concerns with that contractual default have to do
with relative institutional competence.293 If the default were no implied cer-
tification, a contracting agency could get FCA protection against undis-
closed breaches only by contracting for certification, express or implied.
A no-certification default might therefore prompt the agency to determine
what form of FCA liability would best serve the Government’s interests.
This would have two advantages. First, the contracting agency is better situ-
ated than a court to determine whether it will benefit from expanded FCA
liability—whether the added protections of express or implied certification
are worth the above-described costs. Second, the contracting agency is more
likely under the no-certification default to make fine-grained decisions about
which first-order duties the FCA should cover. If the agency independently
monitors for and responds to certain violations, it can protect those regula-
tory processes from FCA interference by not requiring a certification of
compliance with the relevant duties. By requiring a contractor to certify
compliance with some duties and not others, the agency can tailor the reach
of the FCA.294
There are, however, advantages to the implied-certification contractual
default. If most government contracts would benefit from the rule, then it is
290. For further, sometimes speculative, discussion of possible divergences between the in-
terests of qui tam plaintiffs and that of the Government, see Kovacic, supra note 76, at 1825–41.
For a game-theoretic account, see Depoorter & De Mot, supra note 283.
291. “In theory” because the default could be especially sticky.
292. See Ayres & Gertner, Filling Gaps, supra note 19, at 87 (“Default rules fill the gaps in
incomplete contracts; they govern unless the parties contract around them.”).
293. While we emphasize here the relative institutional competences of courts and contract-
ing agencies, there is also the issue of the relative competence of courts and legislatures. As we
argued above, the language of the FCA allows but does not mandate the Ab-Tech rule. We dis-
cuss how Congress might usefully address implied certification in the Conclusion.
294. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Stebner v. Stewart & Stevenson Servs., Inc., 305 F. Supp.
2d 694, 698–99 (S.D. Tex. 2004) (finding that progress payment invoices represented that
defendant complied with the progress payment clause of the contract, and did not address “the
quality of any particular truck or conformance with any particular term in the contract”).
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arguably the majoritarian default—the one most contracting agencies would
or should choose. And we might worry that a no-certification contractual
default is especially sticky, due to the problems of capture and competence.
Perhaps contracting agencies, or the individuals who represent them, cannot
be trusted to insist on certification duties when negotiating contracts.295
Finally, we might prefer the judicially imposed certification default because
it better captures ethical standards to which government contractors should
be held. The judicially created default plays an expressive function. It says
that while parties might contract around those standards, in the normal gov-
ernment contract it is wrong for a contractor to request payment for a con-
tract that it has materially breached.
C. Recommended Reforms
We now have in place an analytic framework for deciding what interpre-
tive rules courts should use to decide when a government contractor has cer-
tified post-formation compliance. The answer depends both on the relative
costs and benefits of interpreting claims for payment as implicitly certifying
compliance and on whether we want agencies or courts deciding the reach of
the FCA. This section applies that framework to evaluate the current state of
FCA jurisprudence and to recommend a few reforms.
We have identified three significant costs of implied certification of com-
pliance: by lowering the pleading bar, the default interpretation of claims in-
creases the costs of frivolous litigation;296 expansive application of the FCA’s
harsh penalties can interfere with more nuanced regulatory responses to vio-
lations;297 and as a contractual default, the rule might in practice prevent
agencies from contracting for more tailored certification duties in ways that
would address the first two costs.298 The FCA’s qui tam provisions magnify
these costs, as relators are unlikely to take account of the Government’s
interest in achieving the best regulatory mix.299
One response would be to abandon implied certification of compliance
altogether. The False Claims Act gives contracting agencies a powerful tool
for monitoring contractors’ compliance with government contracts, statutes,
or regulations. If an agency is worried about detecting a breach or violation,
it can require a contractor to certify compliance with the duty in question.
The FCA makes such certifications credible. Where most breaches of con-
295. Whether this is so is, again, an empirical question. Cutting against it is the widespread
use of mandatory standard terms in federal procurement contracts. The Federal Acquisition
Regulation system contains mandatory contract clauses to be used for particular types of con-
tracts. See, e.g., FAR 12.301(b) (2010) (acquisition of commercial items); FAR subpt. 36.5 (con-
struction and architect-engineer contracts); FAR 41.501 (acquisition of utility services). If indi-
vidual agents of the Government cannot be trusted, perhaps the Federal Acquisition Regulation
system could be. Still, agency capture is a concern.
296. See supra notes 279–82 and accompanying text.
297. See supra notes 283–90 and accompanying text.
298. See supra notes 293–95 and accompanying text.
299. See supra note 290 and accompanying text.
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tract expose a contractor to compensatory damages only, under the FCA
false certifications are punished with treble damages and large per-claim
fines.300 Congress having given contracting agencies this tool, courts should
encourage them to use it in drafting contracts. The best way to do so is to
require contracting agencies that want the protections of the FCA to contract
for them expressly, rather than adopting a contractual default that every
claim represents material compliance. Under such a regime, the agency
would balance the relative effectiveness of FCA certification of compliance
with a given contract term, statute, or regulation against other methods of
monitoring and enforcement. Qui tam plaintiffs would be required to plead
that a defendant contractor actually submitted a false certification. And gov-
ernment contractors would be given notice in the contract of the extent of
their potential liability under the FCA.
While we are sympathetic to the above arguments, we do not advocate
doing away with implied certification of compliance altogether. There are at
least five reasons to keep some version of the judicially created rule. First,
capture and lack of competence mean that we should not always trust
agencies to specify the FCA’s reach. Second, even if agencies attend to FCA
certification, the certification default provides a desirable baseline in nego-
tiations. Rather than asking for additional disclosure duties and greater
potential liability, it puts contracting agencies in a position of negotiating
for tailored express disclosures that will reduce the contractor’s potential lia-
bility.301 Third, we should not forget the certification default’s expressive
function. The certification default affirms that contracting with the Govern-
ment is different, that it imposes heightened ethical obligations not to take
advantage of the other side. Fourth, implied certification is already the rule
in many jurisdictions.302 Before advocating wholesale revision, we should
explore the gains available from less radical change. We argue below that the
Ab-Tech rule can be narrowed in ways that address many of the costs of im-
plied certification. Finally, as we discuss at the end of this section, many of
the gains from abandoning the judicially created doctrines of implied certifi-
cation can be achieved by better practices by contracting agencies under the
existing rules.
So far we have focused our attention on the broadest version of implied
certification of compliance: the Ab-Tech rule that a request for payment re-
presents material compliance with all contract terms and relevant statutes
and regulations.303 We can imagine several ways of limiting the rule to take
account of the problems of frivolous litigation, regulatory interference, and
300. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1) (Supp. III 2009).
301. For the benefits of a favorable default, see Russell Korobkin, Behavioral Economics, Con-
tract Formation, and Contract Law, in BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS 116, 136–37 (C. Sunstein
ed., 2000).
302. Only the Fourth and Fifth Circuits have declined to adopt the implied certification rule.
See supra note 147.
303. Ab-Tech Constr. Co. v. United States, 31 Fed. Cl. 429, 434 (1994).
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institutional competence without abandoning implied certification of com-
pliance altogether.
First, courts could ask in every case whether FCA liability is likely to
interfere with other regulatory mechanisms. Under such a rule, a claim for
payment would represent compliance only with those contract terms, sta-
tutes, or regulations that the Government does not separately monitor and
enforce. Such a rule would directly address the worry about regulatory inter-
ference. And by reducing the scope of implied certification, it would put
some limits on frivolous claims.
Judicial inquiry into regulatory interference has its downsides. The rule
would require time and energy for courts to sort out just when there is suffi-
cient agency monitoring and oversight to exempt an obligation from the
implied certification rule. The outcomes of that inquiry would in some cases
be difficult to predict. And one can imagine circuit splits in its application,
a problem for contractors who might be subject to suits in multiple
jurisdictions.
Another option would be to distinguish compliance with contract terms
from compliance with governing statutes or regulations, and hold that claims
for payment represent only contractual compliance.304 Courts have not ex-
plained why the FCA, which is at its core about fraud in government con-
tracting, should extend to the nondisclosure of regulatory or statutory viola-
tions when such compliance is not expressly incorporated into the contract.
And agencies might be more likely to have well-developed mechanisms to
monitor and enforce statutory and regulatory compliance than the perfor-
mance of a contract. If so, exempting statutory and regulatory compliance
from the implied certification rule would address the threat of regulatory
interference. And the rule has the advantage of clarity. All a court need ask is
whether the alleged wrong was a breach of the contract.
This rule too has its flaws. Most importantly, there are reasons to doubt
whether the distinction between contractual compliance and statutory or
regulatory compliance cuts at the joints. Contracting agencies often do not
monitor for compliance with, for example, labor laws or environmental reg-
ulations. Exempting them from the FCA would remove an important tool
for their enforcement.
Yet a third option would be to draw a line based on the identity of the
parties. If qui tam litigation causes many of the costs of implied certification
of compliance, perhaps the solution is to allow implied certification suits to
go forward only when the Government appears in court, as a party or ami-
cus, to advocate the theory. Unlike the qui tam plaintiff, the Government is
more likely to consider the costs of implied certification when deciding
whether or not to sue, join, or file an amicus brief. In fact, courts may in
304. The court in United States ex rel. Contreras v. Laidlaw Transit, applying the California
FCA, suggests a similar distinction but applies it to avoid the certification-condition rule. 106
Cal. Rptr. 3d 91, 94 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010).
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practice be using government participation as such a proxy. A nonscientific
examination of the cases suggests that courts are more likely to accept a
claim of implied certification when the Government is a party or files an
amicus brief in support of the implied certification claim than when the
Government has chosen not to participate in a case.305
Again the rule has its flaws. Congress first included the FCA’s qui tam
provisions because, in its judgment, agencies cannot always be trusted to
monitor compliance.306 It strengthened the Act’s qui tam provisions in 1986
in response to evidence that both the military and the Department of Justice
were failing to push for full civil recovery for fraudulent contracting prac-
tices.307 We have argued that one of the advantages of Ab-Tech’s contractual
default is that contracting agencies cannot always be trusted to include certi-
fication requirements in their contracts. An agency that fails at the contract-
ing phase, whether because of capture or because of inattention, to require
certification is all the more likely to fail to adequately monitor performance.
Nor is there any support in the language of the Act for imposing on qui tam
plaintiffs a burden that is different from that imposed on the Government.
While Congress might adopt a narrowing principle of this sort, there is little
authority for the courts to do so.
Courts have employed none of these narrowing rules but have opted for a
fourth one: the compliance-condition rule from the Second Circuit’s deci-
sion in Mikes v. Straus.308 The Mikes rule holds that a claim for payment
does not represent material compliance with every term, statute, or regula-
tion, but only with those that expressly provide that their fulfillment is a con-
dition of payment.309
In adopting the compliance-condition rule, the Second Circuit explained
that it was striking a balance between the Government’s interest in enforcing
the Medicaid statute and the parallel role of other administrative bodies in
enforcing that statute and the practice of medicine more generally.310 That
is, the Mikes rule was meant to address the problem of regulatory interfer-
ence. And there is a connection between the rule and that function. The fact
that a contract, statute, or regulation expressly conditions payment on com-
305. Compare Mikes v. Straus, 274 F.3d 687 (2d Cir. 2001) (dismissing implied certification
claim; U.S. attorney declined to intervene in suit), and United States ex rel. Westmoreland v.
Amgen, Inc., 738 F. Supp. 2d 267 (D. Mass. 2010) (same), and Sanches v. City of Crescent City,
No. C 08-1395 MEJ, 2010 WL 1461439 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (same), andHerndon v. Sci. Applica-
tions Int’l Corp., No. 05CV2269-BEN (RBB), 2007 WL 2019653 (S.D. Cal. 2007) (same), with
United States ex rel. Lemmon v. Envirocare of Utah, Inc., 614 F.3d 1163 (10th Cir. 2010) (al-
lowing implied certification claim; U.S. intervened), and United States ex rel. Augustine v. Cen-
tury Health Servs. Inc., 289 F.3d 409, 414–15 (6th Cir. 2002) (same), and United States ex rel.
Sanchez-Smith v. AHS Tulsa Reg’l Med. Ctr., 754 F. Supp. 2d 1270 (N.D. Okla. 2010) (same).
306. SeeH.R. REP. NO. 37-50, at 47 (1863).
307. SeeHelmer & Neff, supra note 27, at 40–51.
308. 274 F.3d 687, 700 (2d Cir. 2001).
309. Id. (read broadly to include not only statutory and regulatory compliance, but also com-
pliance with contract terms).
310. Id. at 699–702.
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pliance evinces a choice to enforce the duty by way of the contract, rather
than through other regulatory mechanisms. If the chosen remedy for a
breach or violation is withholding payment on the contract, then imposing
FCA liability for a failure to disclose a violation when requesting payment
does not interfere with its enforcement. On the contrary, the implied repre-
sentation of compliance in these cases enables the Government to better
exercise its preferred remedy.
The Mikes compliance-condition rule, however, may be too narrowly
drawn. The problem lies in the Second Circuit’s insistence that compliance
be a condition of payment, and that conditions of participation in the contract
do not fall within the implied certification rule.311 The arguments that favor
implied certification of compliance with conditions of payment applies also
to compliance with many conditions of participation.
An examination of the Mikes opinion suggests that what drove the court’s
decision for the defendants was not that compliance with the Medicare pro-
vision at issue was a condition of participation, but that the statute provided
extensive noncontractual monitoring and enforcement mechanisms for the
alleged violation. The relator in Mikes alleged that his former employer had
failed to properly calibrate certain medical devices.312 In rejecting the suit,
the Second Circuit emphasized that the Medicare statute anticipated that
peer-review organizations would monitor for such quality of care violations,
that it defined the statutory violations to include only gross and flagrant der-
eliction in a substantial number of cases, that it mandated that providers be
given reasonable notice of and an opportunity to cure violations, and that it
gave the secretary of Health and Human Services discretion to apply a range
of regulatory responses to such violations.313 But as later decisions have
pointed out, many conditions of participation are not accompanied by such
detailed and extensive monitoring and enforcement mechanisms.314 This is
true, for example, of the Title IV rule that recipients of federal education
subsidies may not pay recruiters on a per-student basis.315 It is even true of
many Medicare conditions of participation, such as nondiscrimination in the
enrollment of patients,316 compliance with the Anti-Kickback Statute,317
and the proper accounting of expenses for setting reimbursement levels.318
311. Id. at 700.
312. Id. at 694–95.
313. Id. at 701–02 (discussing 42 U.S.C. § 1320c-5(a)).
314. The best judicial discussion can be found in the Tenth Circuit’s decision in United States
ex rel. Conner v. Salina Regional Health Center, Inc., 543 F.3d 1211, 1222 (2008).
315. See United States ex rel. Hendow v. Univ. of Phx., 461 F.3d 1166, 1176–77 (9th Cir.
2006).
316. See United States ex rel. Tyson v. Amerigroup Ill., Inc., 488 F. Supp. 2d 719, 725–26
(N.D. Ill. 2007).
317. See United States ex rel. McNutt v. Haleyville Med. Supplies, Inc., 423 F.3d 1256,
1259–60 (11th Cir. 2005); In re Pharm. Indus. Average Wholesale Price Litig., 491 F. Supp. 2d
12, 17–18 (D. Mass. 2007).
318. See United States ex rel. Augustine v. Century Health Servs. Inc., 289 F.3d 409, 415 (6th
Cir. 2002).
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False Claims Act liability for the failure to disclose violations of such condi-
tions of participation does not interfere with other regulatory mechanisms.
More to the point, because the Government does not separately monitor for
compliance with these duties, implied certification of compliance with them,
backed by the FCA, can provide real benefits.
For similar reasons, we agree with the D.C. Circuit that theMikes restric-
tion to express conditions is too restrictive.319 In many cases it will be easy to
show that “both parties to the contract understood that payment was condi-
tional on compliance with the requirement at issue.”320 If the defendant can-
not show a significant risk of regulatory interference, it should be enough
that the nondisclosed breach or violation would have been material to the
Government’s decision to pay a claim.
What begins to emerge is something like a two-part rule. With respect to
express conditions of payment, a claim always represents compliance. With
respect to nonexpress but mutually understood conditions of payment and
conditions of participation, a claim implicitly represents compliance if and
only if the contract, statute, or regulation does not provide for other moni-
toring and enforcement mechanisms that FCA liability would interfere with.
The second part of this rule is similar to the first possible narrowing princi-
ple identified above: a direct judicial inquiry into the potential for regulatory
interference. And it currently suffers from the same problems: increased liti-
gation costs and decreased predictability of case outcomes. But coupled with
the per se rule for express conditions of payment, the benefits of such a rule
seem worth those costs. Many cases involving implied conditions of payment
and conditions of participation do not lie on the border and sophisticated
parties should be able to predict these conditions. We believe that a univer-
sity should know that the Department of Education does not monitor for
incentive-based pay to recruiters or impose sanctions other than termina-
tion, or that a Medicare provider should know that violations of the Anti-
Kickback Statute will result in termination of its contract. In these situations,
the Government can enjoy the advantages of implied certification without
causing undue confusion.
A third question that Mikes did not address concerns the requisite
strength of the condition: Does a claim imply compliance with a contract
term, statute, or regulation that does not mandate nonpayment in cases of
noncompliance, but merely gives the Government the option of withholding
payment? This is a harder question on the above theory. On the one hand,
the fact that the Government has discretion to pay despite a violation might
suggest the availability of other regulatory responses. In Ex rel. Marcy, the
Fifth Circuit considered a provision in an offshore drilling lease that gave
the Government the right to cancel for environmental violations, but did not
319. United States v. Science Applications Int’l Corp., 626 F.3d 1257, 1270 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
320. Id. at 1269.
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require such cancellation.321 In holding that there was no implied certifica-
tion of compliance, the court emphasized that the lease provision also al-
lowed the Government to “exercise ‘other remedies’ available against the
defendant” for such violations.322 If the Government has discretion to pay
despite a violation, that discretion might be to give it the ability to choose a
more nuanced regulatory response. On the other hand, the failure to disclose
a violation when requesting payment effectively prevents the Government
from exercising such choice. One might guess that the cancellation clause
was included in theMarcy contract because the Government knew that envi-
ronmental violations would be particularly difficult to observe. The threat of
cancellation was a way to increase the costs of violating those provisions to
take account of the low probability of detection. If this is right, then FCA
liability for the knowing failure to disclose the violation is appropriate: it ad-
dresses the informational problem that led the Government to include the
termination clause in the first place.
We think the Fifth Circuit’s per se rule inMarcy is, on balance, misguided.
The strength of the condition is a poor proxy for the existence of other me-
chanisms for monitoring and enforcement. There are too many other reasons
for a contract to give the Government the right to a remedy without mandat-
ing that it exercise that right. In some contracts the Government might want
the option of paying because its cost of termination could be very large,
though the threat of nonpayment is the primary means of enforcement. In
other contracts, such language might simply be the result of the inattentive
use of boilerplate. The facts inMarcy exemplify the problem. While the Fifth
Circuit emphasized that the lease mentioned “other remedies” for the envi-
ronmental violations at issue,323 the lease language strongly suggests that the
provision was meant not to describe alternative remedies, but to clarify that
the Government might pursue such remedies in addition to canceling the
lease.324 At the very least, the Fifth Circuit should have more fully explored
what other means the Government had to discover and sanction the environ-
mental violations at issue.
This suggests a rule for nonmandatory conditions of payment similar to
that for conditions of participation: courts should ask whether implied certi-
fication of compliance with the duty in question threatens to interfere with
other regulatory mechanisms. The mere fact that the Government would
have had the option to pay despite the violation should not be enough to
321. United States ex rel. Marcy v. Rowan Cos., 520 F.3d 384, 389–90 (5th Cir. 2008).
322. Id. at 90.
323. Id.
324. “Whenever the Lessee fails to comply with any of the provisions of the [Outer Conti-
nental Shelf Lands] Act, the regulations issued pursuant to the Act, or the terms of this lease, the
lease shall be subject to cancellation in accordance with the provisions of section 5(c) and (d) of
the Act and the Lessor may exercise any other remedies which the lessor may have, including the
penalty provisions of Section 24 of the Act.” Brief for Appellant at 6, United States ex rel. Marcy
v. Rowan Cos., 520 F.3d 384 (5th Cir. 2008) (No. 06-31238), 2007 WL 5196331 (alteration in
original) (emphasis added).
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insulate contractors who request payments without disclosing material viola-
tions from the FCA.
The upshot of our discussion is a rule for implied certification of compli-
ance that lies somewhere between the rules articulated in Ab-Tech and in
Mikes. We suggest a simple burden-shifting test. The fact that a contract
term, statute, or regulation explicitly or implicitly conditions either partici-
pation in or payment for a contract on compliance with that term, statute, or
regulation creates a prima facie case that a claim for payment represents
such compliance. The burden is then on the defendant to show that FCA lia-
bility would interfere with other regulatory mechanisms for monitoring and
enforcing compliance. Such a showing will be difficult if not impossible in
cases in which the contract, statute, or regulation expressly required the
Government to withhold payment for the undisclosed breach or violation. A
defendant is more likely to be able to satisfy that burden when compliance is
a condition of participation rather than payment, when compliance was a
material but not express condition of payment, or when the Government
would have had the discretion to pay despite the violation.
While we think it would be a good thing for courts to adopt such a rule,
we also consider it a second-best solution. Implied certification of compli-
ance allows the FCA to reach undisclosed breaches and violations in con-
tracts where the agency should have but failed to require express certifica-
tion. The first-best solution would be for contracting agencies themselves to
determine the FCA’s reach through express certification requirements.
We have argued that implied certification of compliance is a contractual
default: the parties should be able to contract for alternative interpretations
of claims for payment. Significant gains can therefore be achieved by better
government contracting practices under any implied certification rule. Con-
tracting agencies should consider the costs and benefits of implied certifica-
tion and write their contracts accordingly. They should require express certi-
fication of compliance for those contractual, statutory, or regulatory duties
that are best enforced through self-reporting, and, if appropriate, stipulate
that a claim for payment shall not represent compliance with other obliga-
tions.325 Such tailored certification requirements are especially appropriate
in standard-form government contracts in highly regulated areas, such as
Medicare provider agreements. It is cheaper and more effective for the
agency to decide the scope of FCA certification ex ante than it is for courts
to do so ex post. There are also opportunities to encourage greater agency
325. It is an interesting question what it should take to opt out of an implied certification
contractual default. One possibility would be to say that it is enough to require express certifica-
tion of compliance with some duties. Under this rule, the fact that a contract requires express
certification would mean that a claim for payment does not represent implied compliance with
others. We worry that such a rule would be open to abuse. By agreeing to certify compliance
with some obligations, a contractor could effectively escape FCA liability for the failure to
report the breach or violation of others. It would therefore be better to require the parties ex-
pressly to contract out of the implied certification default.
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attention to the scope of certification through the Federal Acquisition Regu-
lation system. The FAR regulations currently permit agencies to use “certifi-
cates of conformance” in lieu of source inspections when any defect would
only involve small losses or the contractor is especially trustworthy.326 It
might be amended to encourage or require agencies to adopt certificates of
compliance in other circumstances, such as when compliance would other-
wise be especially difficult to detect.
V. CONCLUSION
Implied certification of post-formation compliance plays an important
role in the regulation of government contracts. By effectively imposing on
contractors a duty to disclose material breaches, implied certification ad-
dresses the Government’s difficulties in monitoring performance and recog-
nizes the special ethical obligations that attach to government contracts. As a
contractual default, the rule also addresses the problems of agency capture
and competence in the contracting process, making it more likely that the pro-
tections of the False Claims Act will reach contractors who attempt to take
advantage of lax government oversight. In practice, courts have applied the
doctrine in a way that generally prevents interference with other regulatory
mechanisms and protects contractors against frivolous qui tam lawsuits. And
because the rule is a mere default, it leaves room for contracting agencies to
further specify defaults and disclosure duties in individual transactions.
The best rule for when a claim for payment implicitly represents perfor-
mance lies somewhere between the rules in Ab-Tech and in Mikes. The fact
that compliance with a contract term, statute, or regulation is a condition of
payment for or participation in a government contract should create a strong
legal presumption that a claim for payment under the contract implicitly re-
presents such compliance. That presumption should be rebutted only if a
defendant can show that FCA liability would interfere with other regulatory
mechanisms. Such a showing is difficult if not impossible where the agency
or legislature has expressly provided that compliance is a condition of pay-
ment. It is easier where compliance is a condition only of participation in the
transaction where the condition is implicit, or where the rule gives govern-
ment decision makers discretion to pay despite a breach or violation.
Even under our more tailored rule, implied certification is not without its
costs. This is why we would welcome greater agency attention to certifica-
tion in the drafting of contracts. We also note that many of the costs of im-
plied certification of compliance come not from the rule itself, but from
other aspects of the False Claims Act. We have already described how the
availability of qui tam actions magnifies the costs of implied certification.
While qui tam actions are an essential part of the FCA’s architecture, Con-
gress might consider raising the bar for claims of implied certification in
326. FAR 46.504 (2010).
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cases where the Government elects not to appear. Also relevant in this
respect are the FCA’s mandatory penalties, particularly the $5,000 to
$10,000 per-claim fines.327 In cases involving factual falsehoods—claims for
goods or services not provided—those fines bear some relation to the under-
lying wrong. Each claim is another lie. This is not so in cases involving legal
falsehoods, expressed or implied. Here the underlying wrong is the false
certification or undisclosed violation. The seriousness of such a lie or nondi-
sclosure bears no relationship to the number of times the contractor billed
the Government for goods or services rendered. The multiplying effect of
per-claim fines further increases the potential costs of frivolous litigation
and the potential interference of the FCA with other regulatory mechanisms.
The Act’s remedial structure is another area that might benefit from legisla-
tive attention.
Finally, and more generally, Congress should consider amending the
False Claims Act to expressly recognize and regularize implied certification.
Section 3729(a)(1)(G), which authorizes reverse FCA claims, already in-
cludes such language.328 In addition to imposing liability on a contractor
who “knowingly makes, uses, or causes to be made or used, a false record or
statement”—the same language as that in section (1)(B)—section (1)(G) im-
poses liability on one who “knowingly conceals or knowingly and impro-
perly avoids or decreases an obligation to pay or transmit money or property
to the Government.”329 While this formulation is not perfect, by adding
some such language to section (1)(B) Congress could provide clearer statu-
tory authority for the implied certification doctrine.330
Implied certification of compliance under the False Claims Act is also
ripe for consideration by the Supreme Court. The above analysis suggests
that if the Court grants certiorari on the issue, much could depend on the
facts of the case. The opinions in Skilling v. United States, which sharply lim-
ited the scope of “honest services” fraud, suggests that at least in the criminal
context this Court is unsympathetic to broad definitions of “fraud.”331 If the
first implied certification case to reach the Supreme Court involves a viola-
tion that might have been subject to a noncontractual and discretionary reg-
ulatory response, such as one often sees in the Medicare context, the Court
is more likely to take a dim view of the implied certification rule. If the case
327. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1) (Supp. III 2009).
328. Id. § 3729(a)(1)(G).
329. Id.
330. One possible formulation: “any person who … (2) knowingly makes, uses, or causes to
be made or used, a false record or statement material to a false or fraudulent claim, or knowingly
fails to disclose a breach or violation that is material to such a claim … is liable to the United States
Government. …”
331. 130 S. Ct. 2896, 2931–32 (2010) (limiting the “honest services” fraud statute to encom-
pass only cases involving bribes and kickbacks and rejecting the Government’s argument that it
also encompasses “undisclosed self-dealing”). See also id. at 2941 (Alito, J., concurring) (agreeing
with the Court’s limitation on the “honest services” fraud statute); id. at 2942 (Sotomayor, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (same); id. at 2935 (Scalia, J., concurring) (arguing that
the honest services fraud statute is unconstitutionally vague).
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involves a more straightforward breach or violation, knowledge of which
clearly would have caused the Government to deny payment or participation
in the program, the Court is likely to be more sympathetic. Given the overall
positive role that implied certification plays in the regulation of government
contracts, we hope that the first case to reach the Court satisfies the latter
description. At present, implied certification under the FCA is an unruly
rose bush. While it would benefit from a trellis and some pruning, it would
be a shame to cut it back too far or remove it from the garden altogether.
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